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11.  Introduction
The financial  problems  faced by PAYG schemes around  the world has led several countries
to curtail public pension benefits and promote supplementary  private pension provision, either by
encouraging a voluntary (third) pillar through tax incentives, and/or by introducing a mandatory
(second) pillar.  The desire to achieve a high rate of coverage in private pension provision has led
an increasing number of countries to introduce a second and mandatory pillar, not only in Latin
America, but also in Europe.  Within  the next decades, the mandatory and voluntary private pillars
are expected to provide a significant share of retirement income in many countries.  As a result,
there has been a growing interest in analyzing the institutional  and regulatory framework of the
pension industry, and assessing whether the  industry will be  able to  meet the  expectations of
workers and policy makers.
In analyzing the regulatory framework for the pension industry, it is important to identify
the types of risks that the industry is exposed to, assess whether the regulatory framework in most
countries is prepared to cope with these risks, and whether there is room for further improvements.
In examining these questions, it may prove useful to ascertain whether there are  lessons to be
learned from other areas of the financial  sector, especially  from the banking sector.
There are at least two major factors justifying a comparison of the regulatory frameworks
for banks and pensions, and identifying  possible lessons from the former to the latter.  First, the
regulatory framework of the banking sector has been extensively  examined, more so than any other
area of the financial  system, and some important issues identified in this sector may be applicable  to
pensions.  Second, banking regulation  has evolved continuously  over the recent decades, in good
part in response to episodes of banking crisis and failures.  The experience that bank regulators
have acquired, both in attempting to prevent crisis and dealing with actual crisis episodes may be
relevant to pension regulators.
The main objective of this paper is to review the regulatory framework for pension funds,
and examine whether there is scope for improvements  in pension regulation, particularly in light of
regulatory and supervisory developments in the banking industry.  The paper is structured as
follows.  The second section summarizes the  literature on  banking regulation and supervision,
identifying the areas of consensus and the trends in regulation and supervision across countries.
The third section summarizes  the literature  on the regulation  of pension systems. The fourth section
examines the scope for improvements  in pension regulation, identifying  possible lessons from the
banking sector to the pension industry. The fifth section provides a summary and concludes.
2.  Regulation  and Supervision  of the Banking  Sector
2.1.  The Challenges  of Bank Regulation
Banks are at  the center stage of business and economic activity in  any country.  They
provide  essential financial services to  the  economy, mobilizing savings  and  allocating scarce
resources to productive uses.  Unless specifically prohibited to do so by national laws, banks have
also become major players in capital market activities, often through the formation of financial
conglomerates. Moreover, banks provide also the kernel of national payment systems and are the
major conduit of monetary policy.  Promoting a healthy and efficient banking system has been,
therefore, a crucial policy goal of Government  and society at large.
The banking sector has always received more policy attention than other sectors of the
financial system.  This has been due to the dominant  position of banks in the financial  system, the
particular structure  of their assets and liabilities, and the huge leverage with which banks operate.
2Banking activities typically involve the transformation of  short-term liabilities into longer-term
assets (loans) that are difficult to value and monitor.  As a result of these activities, banks are
subject to a variety of risks, such as credit, liquidity, interest rate, and currency risks.  Banks are
also subject to inside abuse, fraud, and other agency risks.  The high leverage in banking and the
structure  of bank liabilities, imply together a substantial  degree of exposure  of capital to these risks,
and the possibility of contagion effects triggering a chain of bank runs and failures.
The specter of massive bank runs and failures with disruptive consequences  for economic
activity, and  the  perception that social costs  of  failures  may  well exceed private costs,  has
traditionally  led to a great degree of intervention  in the banking system. In addition to the existence
of central banks providing lending of last resort, Governments have tried to reduce the probability
of bank runs by introducing  explicit deposit insurance.  For example, the US insures deposits up to
US$  100,000 and  the  EU  countries have  to  comply  with  a  directive imposing a  minimum
compensation  of EURO 20,000 per depositor, and a  large number of other countries today also
provide an explicit insurance scheme (Garcia (1998)). In several occasions,  both the US and the EU
countries have also bailed out bank depositors (particularly of banks deemed as too large to fail) on
an ad hoc basis, in excess of the statutory insurance ceilings, and other countries have frequently
followed  the same policy.
Deposit insurance may reduce drastically the likelihood of bank runs, but is also known to
generate moral hazard, aggravating  considerably the principal-agent  problem in banking.  Over the
recent decades, there has been an extensive  discussion  on the best strategy to deal with moral hazard
and reduce the incentives for banks to undertake excessive risks.  More radical proposals include
the  complete elimination of  deposit insurance and/or  the  establishment of  "narrow"  banks,
accompanied  by the deregulation  of the financial  sector.  These proposals  are based on the view that
the risks of systemic runs and failures affecting sound banks have been largely over-estimated,  and
that deposit insurance.  and financial  regulation  have actually introduced  more instability.'
These more radical proposals have not been adopted anywhere, because of the perception
that  the  negative externalities associated with  bank  runs  are  serious  enough to  justify  the
maintenance  of some deposit insurance, and that the "narrow" bank model would introduce other
problems (e.g. a less efficient payments system, less economies of scope in banking), while also
failing  to solve adequately  the problem of vulnerability  to bank runs 2.
The set of measures that have been proposed to enhance prudent banking in the presence of
deposit insurance, both  in the academic literature and by  international and  national regulatory
agencies, can be grouped into four broad classes.  The first involves measures designed to reduce
the scope of insurance and improve  its pricing.  The second involves a great variety of quantitative
regulations designed to  ensure  minimum levels  of  capital,  limit  risk-concentrations, reduce
regulatory forbearance, and foster transparent financial reporting by banks.  The third involves
qualitative standards designed to enhance the accountability of bank management, improve banks'
'Dowd (1996)  proposes  the adoption  of "free  banking",  involving  not only  the elimination  of deposit
insurance  and the complete  deregulation  of the financial  sector, but also the abolishment  of central  banks.
Benston  and Kaufman  (1996)  basically  endorse  Dowd's  views  on deposit  insurance  and regulation,  but stop
short of recommending  its elimination,  and in general provide a less radical discussion  of the subject.
Discussions  of narrow  banking  can be found, e.g., in Litan (1987), Guttentag  and Herring  (1988),  Pierce
(1983),  and  White  (1989).
2 A summary  of the criticism  of the narrow  banking  model  can be found  in Randall  (1993).
3capacity  to manage  risk  and  strengthen bank  governance  more generally.  The fourth  involves the
development of a strong and pro-active supervisory  capacity. 3
Most countries  have decided  to deal  with the  moral  hazard problem  and  enhance  prudent
banking  through  a  combination  of  these  four  inter-related  sets  of  measures.  There  is  still  no
universal  consensus  among  regulators  and  academics  on  all  the  elements  of  the  optimal  policy
menu,  and  differences  in  the  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework  of  different  countries  still
remain.  However,  it is also fair to say that most developed  countries have advanced significantly in
these four broad  areas,  and  also  that there  has  been  some progress  in harmonizing  the regulatory
framework  across  borders.  The  1988  international  agreement  on  capital  adequacy  requirements
sponsored  by  the  Basle  Committee,  the  more  recently  proposed  Core  Principles  for  Bank
Supervision  (Basle Committee  (1997)),  and  the numerous  EU directives regulating  the operation  of
banks in the common market,  are a clear evidence of this ongoing progress.
2.2.  Reforming  Deposit Insurance
Various measures  have  been proposed  to offset directly the moral  hazard  effects of deposit
insurance,  by  enhancing  incentives  for  more  market  monitoring  of  banks  and  improving  market
discipline.  These  measures  include  capping  the  statutory  insurance  limits  at  lower  levels,
introducing  more  co-insurance,  making  more  use  of  market-priced  subordinated  debt,  ensuring
extensive disclosure  of the banks'  financial conditions,  and making insurance  fees more risk-based. 4
Ensuring  a  greater  role  for  market-based  subordinated  debt  is  a  popular  proposal,  and  this
instrument  is already  allowed  in the  computation  of capital  adequacy  ratios  (as  tier  two capital).5
Also,  an  increasing  number  of  countries  have  started  costing  the  price  of  the  deposit  insurance
premium according  to the risks of failure posed  by each bank's  condition.  Within the OECD,  these
countries include the US, Canada,  Sweden, Norway,  Finland,  Portugal,  and Italy 6.
2.3.  Quantitative  Prudential  Regulations
Quantitative  prudential  regulations  are  those  rules  and  standards  that  aim  at preserving  a
buffer  of tangible  capital to absorb potential  losses  emanating from  risks.  These  regulations  also
intend to diversify the risks that banks assume  and ensure  minimum levels of liquid  and safe assets.
The most widely adopted regulations  include:
*  Minimum entry and capital adequacy rules that reflect the risks that banks undertake;
. Appropriate  limits  on  risk  concentrations  with  individual  and  groups  of  related
borrowers;
A comprehensive  survey of the voluminous literature on banking regulation is out of the scope of
this paper.  This section summarizes  the main issues very briefly, sometimes  at the cost of oversimplification.
Comprehensive  analysis of financial  regulation  may be found, e.g., in Benston  and Kaufman (1988), Benston
et al (1989), Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998); Goodhart  et al (1998), Llewellyn  (1999), Calomiris
(1998), Bhattacharia  et al (1998), Estrella (1998), and Randall (1993).  This short list probably excludes
important  contributions  to the literature.
4  The literature on deposit insurance and the number of proposals for improvements in insurance
design are equally voluminous. See, e.g., White (1989), Kupiec and O'Brien (1998), Dotsey and Kuprianov
(1990), Kopcke (1995), Benston (1993), FDIC (1998), Thomson (1990), Rolnick (1993), Kuprianov and
Mengle (1989), and Garcia (1998).
5 Argentina's central bank has recently required banks to place subordinated  debt and obtain ratings
as a test for market perception.
6  Garcia (1998) provides a comparative analysis of deposit insurance schemes and reports that 11
countries  already risk-adjust  their premiums. See also FDIC (1998), and CDIC (1998).
4. Limits  on  other  types of  financial risk  concentrations in  investment and  trading
activities;
*  Asset classification and provisioning rules establishing the  fair value of the bank's
assets, contingencies, collateral, and designed to disclose the real value of the bank's
capital;
*  Minimum  requirements for holdings  of liquid assets.
In addition to these core regulations,  the regulatory framework of some countries has been
extended to  include rules  limiting the  scope  for  regulatory forbearance, as  the  discretion of
supervisors to allow temporary divergences  from quantitative  regulations  can delay the resolution of
failing banks and exacerbate the costs of failures, especially  when supervisors are subject to intense
political interference.  These rules are  designed to  trigger prompt  action by  supervisors, and
typically  include thresholds  on the level of the capital adequacy  ratio, with each threshold triggering
a set of predetermined actions, leading ultimately to the closure and resolution of problem banks
before their capital declines to negative levels.
2.4.  Qualitative  Prudential  Regulation
There is a growing  perception that even the best quantitative  regulations  are not sufficient  to
avoid the recurrence of crisis.  First, prudential ratios are not sufficiently related to the conditions
of individual institutions and the realities of some countries (the "one  size fits all"  problem).
Second, the quantitative regulations are not really a substitute for good bank governance.  Third,
the rules adopted are frequently inspected ex-post for compliance, sometimes without rigorous
enforcement, rather than monitored ex-ante to prevent the build-up of risk concentrations.  In
addition, quantitative regulations do not reveal on time the concentration of risk that frequently
happens during an expansionary cycle (due to the herd behavior of bankers).'  The quality of the
strategies  to manage risks are crucial to mitigate failures in the downturn phase of the cycle.
Although  quantitative  prudential  regulations  remain  an  essential  component  of  the
regulatory framework for banks, there is also a growing recognition of the need for the regulatory
framework  to promote better bank governance  and the internal  management of risks.  Thus, there is
a growing awareness  that quantitative  regulations  must be complemented  by a set of qualitative rules
specifying the  rights  of  shareholders, the  tasks  and  responsibilities of  boards  and  senior
management, the external and internal auditing functions, and  the adoption of mechanisms to
manage the most fundamental types of  risks.  These qualitative standards intend to place the
primary responsibility  for compliance  and supervision  where it belongs: the banks themselves or,
more concretely, their boards, external auditors, and shareholders.  The standards should provide
for an enforceable framework of incentives  to promote prudent behavior more generally speaking--
not  just quantitative  rules for capital and risk diversification'.
Therefore, the  regulatory framework for  banking should  expand from  the  traditional
quantitative  regulations  to include qualitative standards  such as:
*  Rules regarding the  role and responsibilities  of boards of directors to:  select, oversee, and
dismiss senior managers; ensure that managers operate appropriate risk management  techniques;
review bank performance; verify independently  the accuracy of information and the efficiency
of risk controls; and ensure the compliance  with laws and regulations.  To be effective, these
responsibilities  have to be legally enforceable.
7 Randall  (1993).
8 CDIC  (1998).
5*  Requirements  for boards of directors to promote transparency and accountability, to adopt an
appropriate code of conduct, to disclose and limit the operations  that the bank may enter with
related parties, and to prohibit self-dealing.
*  Appropriate mechanisms  to manage the various risks (credit, liquidity, market, interest rate),
the organization  of control structures ensuring  that exceptions  and errors are promptly reported;
and the operation of an internal audit function reporting directly to the board and ensuring the
compliance  with  prudential regulations.
*  Appropriate standards for  information and  accounting systems formulating the  minimum
requirements  for a bank's records and accounts.
Internal and external audits are key elements of the corporate govemance of banks.  They
provide essential  services to banks' senior management, boards, and shareholders, by assessing the
integrity of financial reporting, and the efficiency of control systems. External auditing is also
important for  supervision, since it can provide a  first  level of assessment of the  integrity of
accounts, compliance  with the regulations,  and the efficiency  of controls.
Despite the potential value of auditing in corporate governance, external auditors have
frequently failed to  identify and report on  time the accumulation of problems.  Auditors face
conflicts of interest that preclude them to report objectively  on prospective  solvency (the bank pays
for  the  audit,  and  management can  frequently remove  the  auditor without the  approval  of
shareholders  and/or supervisors). The regulatory framework should, therefore, strengthen auditors'
independence  and responsibilities  towards shareholders and supervisors.  Different measures that
have been adopted for this purpose include: obligatory rotation of extemal auditors; obligatory
reporting to  independent directors'  audit committees; obligatory assessment of  the integrity of
controls and systems; ad-hoc changes to audit programs to focus on asset valuation and income
recognition; limits to consulting  services, and previous shareholder and supervisory approval to the
removal of auditors.
Ideally, the regulatory framework should not only ensure that the extemal audit function is
an effective component  of corporate governance, but also enable it to become an effective tool for
bank supervision. To this end, bank supervisors must be able to influence the audit programs and
have full access to their outcomes and working papers.  Moreover, auditors must have a reporting
responsibility to  supervisors.  Some developed countries have  gone even  further,  essentially
replacing external audits for on-site examinations.
In banking, there is a consensus  that external audit is an essential component of corporate
govemance,  and that it can be  an effective tool of bank  supervision.  However, there  is  no
consensus on whether external audit can be strengthened  to a point where it can replace entirely one
of the critical elements of supervision-on-site examinations.  Although the experience of some
developed countries in  this area has been positive, it would be  dangerous to  extrapolate this
experience to other countries, particularly  developing  countries.  For one, the legal responsibilities
of auditors are neither clear nor enforceable in many countries.  Also,  the profession is not
sufficiently  developed  in many of these countries. Finally, the profession frequently rejects further
and expanded responsibilities  that conflict  with their perceived and more traditional  role.
In general terms, countries that have experienced  episodes of banking crisis do not rely on
extemal audits as the primary instrument  of on-site supervision,  as there is a general perception that
auditors failed  to  warn  on  time.  Instead, these  countries try  to  strengthen  direct  on-site
examinations,  while also giving examiners  more powers over external auditing  procedures.
62.5.  Bank Supervision:  Basic Strategy  and Objectives
Despite the progressive convergence of prudential regulations in some concrete areas, one
can still observe marked differences on the approach and organization of bank supervision  across
countries. This is due to the fact that supervisory arrangements are heavily dependent on historic,
social  and  institutional arrangements particular to  a  country.  The  structure and  quality of
supervision  is partly a developmental  problem-the  limited supervisory capacity  in most developing
countries reflects the lack of more general instiwtional development.  However, there are other
fundamental differences as well, resulting from different legal backgrounds and country-specific
experiences with financial crisis-bank  supervision tends to become much more pro-active and
involved  in failure resolution  in the aftermath of severe crisis.
At  the  risk  of  oversimplification, one  can  identify a  four-stage evolutionary process
characterizing the development of bank supervision.  As shown in Box 1, the most basic stage
consists in developing minimum capacity to assess compliance with quantitative regulations 9. A
fundamental departure from this mechanic form of supervision happens as a  result of a  severe
banking crisis.  The experience left by a crisis leads to a better understanding by Government  and
society of the importance  of the role of supervision, with more willingness  to grant supervisors  the
power and the resources  to minimize  the probability of future crisis.
Box 1 - Stages of Evolution in Bank Supervision
Accelerate  Process  of Evolution  with  Incentives  that
Translate  RespoEsibility  for  Prudent  Behaviour  to  -
Bank  Managers  & Directors
Stage  I:  Develop  Capacity  Stage  2:  Develop  Capacity  Stage  3: Develop  Capacity  Stage  4:  Develop  M?eans  to
to  Diagnose  Viability  to  Resolve  Problems  to  Assess  Risk  Translate  Responsibility  to
Management  Market
Focus  on traditional  Focus  on Resolving  those
Assessment  of  Financial  banks  rated  as  pan  of  the  Focus  on assessing  the  When System  is more  natured
Condition:  asset  quality.  Diagnostic  as  probiemi  and  quality  of banks'  risk  &  stable:  Focus  on making
earnings, credit  risk  failed  banks  (crucial  to  management  frameworks  Investors  more  responsible  of
management,  and arms  minimize  regulatory  and processes:  improve  their  decisions:  augment
lengtt  lending:  detect  bad  forbearance):  weed-out  bad  stability  by  minimizing  ex-  disclosure,  bring-in
banks  and  bankers.  banks  and  bankers.  ante  risk  behaviour  and  risk  subordinated  classes,  institute
concentrations.  co-insurance
Make  Auditors  fully  Responsible  for  Accounting  and
L______  Internal  Control  Review  with  Supervisors  focusing  on
bankers  capacity  to manage  risks  and  the systems
used  for that.
The  second  stage  is  usually  characterized  by  a  more  interventionist approach and
concentration  of power and responsibilities  in the supervisor agency.  During this stage, supervisors
are more actively involved in problem and failure resolution.  Finally, the last stages follows an
increasing  understanding  by goverrnents  and supervisors that a stable and efficient banking system
needs to have prudent  bankers following  best standards  of business and financial  practice.  It is then
that the regulatory framework and the supervisory approach mature and shift to a more qualitative
and broad-based  approach: that of providing better incentives  for prudent banking and redistributing
risk and responsibilities  to all market players. '°
It is becoming clear in many developed countries that bank supervision  should not restrict
its role to ensuring compliance with risk diversification, capital adequacy, and other traditional
9 It should be noted that in less developed countries it is difficult to accomplish  even this very basic
task,  due to  the lack  of resources  and  experienced  supervisory  staff.
10  For example,  the FED's Risk-Focus; the OCC's Supervision  by Risk; and the FSA's  RATE
approach.
7quantitative  indicators. The role of bank supervision  is leaning more and more towards assessing
the  "attitude and  ability of  bankers" to  identify and  manage risk,  and  transferring as  much
responsibility as possible to directors and senior management (and to their external auditors) for
banking prudently.  If managers have better incentives  and legal responsibilities  to operate their
banks properly (overseen  by owners and creditors), the burden of achieving stability  is more evenly
distributed, instead  of being entirely plotted  on the supervisor's shoulders.
Box 2
-.  -Building  Blocks of Supervision
POBLEM EX-ANTE  ON-GOING  ROLUTION
Licensg-ex-Novo  Banks  &  Ban,kers  Exam-nation  Plannng  &  E-ecution  Intensive  Problem  Bank  Super-ision
Approvai  of Corporate  Activtses  &  Changes  Com  -uncation  so-with  Banks'  Boards  Formal  Enforcernent  Actions.  Orders
Policy  Research  to Reveal  Systemic  Issues  Off-Site  Trend  Monitoring  between  Exams  Reorganization  & Res-cnsuring  Plans
Advocating  & Promotng  Correct  Incentives  Assessmg  & Strengthemng  of Audit  Programs  Removal  Diectors,  Managers,  Auditors
Planning  &  De-elop-ent  of  Regulations  Promotmng Self-Adopted  Srengthenng  Plans  Dilution  of Owneship  by  New  Investors
Prude-tia  Repo-Sg  & Disclosure  issues  Informal  &  Formal Enforcemet  as Contracts  Failyig  Bank  Resolution:  Franchise  Transferal
Today, most advanced supervisory agencies operate under a  risk focus approach whose
emphasis is double: strengthen  the ability of each bank to manage and absorb risks, and anticipate
the accumulation of risk  in the system.  The activities of those agencies  .are formalized in a
communicated  supervisory strategy that spells out the minimum requirements for managing risks
that are expected to be followed in practice.  Those agencies allocate supervisory resources in a
graduated manner to the problems detected, with the aim of allocating more resources to the areas
of greatest risk, and correcting negative  trends before they become unmanageable  and too costly to
resolve. II
2.6.  The Building  Blocks of Bank Supervision
The Basle Committee has proposed structuring the supervisory function into three basic
building bocks:  licensing or  ex-ante supervision, on-going supervision, and  enforcement and
resolution procedures, or ex-post supervision 1 2. As shown in Box 2,  these building blocks are
clearly integrated, although countries may need to put more emphasis in one of these building
blocks  depending  on their specific conditions  and stages of development.
2. 7.  Ex-ante Supervision: The  Licensing  Function
Licensing plays an important role in ensuring the viability of new banks and the integrity
and fitness of those who will control and manage them.  The licensing function should not be
restricted simply to providing licenses based on certain criteria, but also be empowered to evaluate
and authorize all major changes in the original license granted.  This should embrace: significant
changes in the control of institutions;  additions to the catalog of permissible activities; appointment
of directors, senior managers, and  statutory auditors; mergers and  acquisitions; domestic and
international  expansion;  changes  in the composition  of capital; and related party transactions.
The original license granted should be provisional, and maintained only as far as the bank
fulfills the conditions  dictated by the law or agreed with the supervisor. The conditions  set forth in
Estrella  (1998), and Foot (1999).
12  Basle  Committee  (1997).
8the license would bring the original charter closer to a form of "narrow banking". It should contain
and update periodically  targets for institutional  development, quantitative  risk limits, and additional
levels of capital adequacy  above the minimum  ratio.
This approach to licensing would serve to anchor a system of regulatory incentives that
promotes responsibility by bankers rather than just  compliance with quantitative regulations.  As
those in charge of on-going supervision evaluate the progress in implementing  the original targets
agreed with a bank's board, there should be an agreement to strengthen or liberalize the conditions
imposed to a particular bank.  This approach should serve to establish contractual targets agreed
with directors and senior management for a concrete bank to strengthen its institutional  processes
and risk management  framework.
2.8.  On-Going  Supervision
While the process for on-going supervision  varies from country to country, supervisors use
several methods or  tools for such purposes, including: on-site examination, off-site surveillance,
contacts  with internal  and external auditors,  and interviews  with  senior management.
On-site examinations  usually  involve  an assessment  of asset quality, earnings,  asset and liability
management,  liquidity,  and the depth of management  systems  and controls. On-site examinations  can
take different  forms, depending  on the sophistication  and experience  of the supervisors  and the degree
of development  in the banking system.  In more sophisticated  systems, supervisors  go beyond simply
determining  banks' financial  condition, to assess the manner in which banks manage risk.' 3 Thus,
supervisors  assess the effectiveness  of the bank's internal controls.and  audit procedures, management
information  and risk management  systems, in order to arrive to an overall evaluation  of a given bank.
Alternatively, supervisors may  decide to rely in different degrees on  the external and internal
auditors of banks.  In this case, supervisors must have full access to all the audit results, make sure
that auditors are independent  and capable, and that they follow adequate rules and procedures.
The basic objective  of off-site surveillance  is, in turn, to monitor the condition  of individual
banks, provide early identification  of problems, and target scarce supervisory resources to areas or
activities  of greatest risk.  An off-site  surveillance  function  intends  to augment  the power of the on-site
supervision process and  provides an  on-going tool  to  evaluate financial perfornance  between
examinations. Off-site  surveillance  systems  should  be used as complements  to on-site supervision,  not
as substitutes,  and are highly  dependent  on the quality  of the reported  infornation. Facts crucial for the
supervisory  process, such as loan portfolio  strategy,  the quality  of loans, or the bank's internal  policies
and procedures,  can only  be effectively  evaluated  through  on-site  supervision.
Management meetings (interviews with  top  bank  managers)  are  also  used  by  bank
supervisors to verify how well the business is doing, what is management's basic strategy, and how
well policy is implemented. In more sophisticated  systems,  management interviews tend to replace
parts of the on-site examination  process.
Finally, the enforcement  function is crucial to the efficiency of the supervisory process.  It
requires clear powers and an objective legal framework to mitigate risks of litigation, overreaction,
inaction, and interference.  It  is crucial to promote the importance of this function within the
organization of  the  supervisory agency,  to  help  avoid  that  internal  processes  and  external
interference dilute its efficiency.  Enforcement can be made more efficient by developing a pro-
active communication approach aimed at  encouraging bank directors and  managers to  remedy
weaknesses  detected, if necessary imposing  sanctions and operational  restrictions.
3 Estrella  (1998)
9There are  several ways to  organize the  different supervisory functions within a  bank
supervisory  agency.  Some agencies  place on-site and off-site activities  in two different departments,
while other agencies  combine all the on-going  supervision  activities  under a single department, and
distribute  the supervised  banks among internal  units considering  their perceived  condition-problem or
sound, large versus local.  There is a  growing effort to optimize the use of scarce supervisory
resources,  graduating  the use of  supervisory  tools to the perceived  risk profile of each bank (frequent
examinations  of problem  banks, enhanced  audit programs  plus off-site  for better rated ones).
2.9.  Ex-Post Supervision: The Intervention  and Resolution  Function
The speed in resolving problem banks is crucial to  minimize the costs associated with
failure.  In several countries, handling failing banks is assigned to supervisors, which might not be
always the most suitable arrangement. In  others, the  resolution is carried over by  specialized
agencies (Bank  Resolution  Agencies, or a Deposit Insurance Fund) that have their own organization
and legal framework.  Finally, there are other situations where the responsibility is assigned to
ordinary courts.  The later might be the lesser efficient alternative for developing  countries whose
judicial systems do not work efficiently.  The lack of a  suitable mechanism and rules for failure
resolution  has often delayed  and complicated  closures.
Whether resolution is or not a formal responsibility  of the supervisory agency, supervisors
are usually involved  in the resolution process, especially in the preliminary steps that precede the
withdrawal of a bank license.  It is a crucial responsibility of bank supervisors to minimize the
impact that a bank failure  might have on the depositors and the system  as a whole.
For the purpose of minimizing costs, supervisors have to closely watch the capital position
of each institution.  Measuring the true capital position of a bank is not a straightforward task,
because loan assessment is a subjective exercise. The problem of measuring capital is even more
acute in emerging countries, which are subject to  much greater volatility." 4 Many supervisory
agencies  hold the view that a more reliable measurement  of the banks' true capital can only be done
by examining  on site the quality of the loans, lending to related parties, and the degree of cosmetic
accounting. There is also a growing awareness that the value of many bank assets usually falls once
the decision  to liquidate  is taken, due to perverse market incentives  and information  asymmetries.
Accordingly, there is a growing recognition that supervisors should take action at much
earlier point than when regulatory capital is depleted.  As mentioned before, prompt action is
assured  in  several regulatory  frameworks by  announcing publicly trigger  levels  in  capital
deterioration that indicate at  which points the supervisor must intervene or impose conservatory
measures.  The use of intervention and resolution triggers is a mechanism designed to minimize
regulatory forbearance due  to  political interference or  inaction, and,  ultimately, to  minimize
disruptions  and the costs of bank closure.
2.10.  The  Legal Structure  and Scope of the Supervision  Agency
In many countries, lawmakers and  the govermnent have faced  obstacles to  grant  the
necessary powers and resources to  banking supervision. Often, powers  that are  necessary to
supervision (licensing, regulatory, enforcement, and closure powers) are limited or assigned to
other areas of State administration.  This  results into institutional fragmentation and  political
14 Caprio  and Honohan  (1999)  indicate  that emerging  countries  have been subject  to many more
episodes  of financial  crisis,  and  that  the average  fiscal  cost  of banking  crisis  in these  countries  has been  twice
larger  (as a share  of GDP)  than  the average  cost  in developed  countries.
10interference that leads to inaction and excessive forbearance when measures are needed.  In many
countries, supervisory agencies  are also unable to attract and retain qualified staff due to insufficient
resources and low salary scales.  The resulting  problems of technical incompetence  and corruption
may also lead to extreme cases of regulatory forbearance.
There  are  a  number  of  institutional and  regulatory factors that  may  determine  the
effectiveness of a  supervisory agency.  The agency must be  able to pay  salaries that  are not
significantly  lower than the salaries paid in the industry, if possible financed from an independent
source of revenues (e.g. mandatory contributions).  Decent salaries should be accompanied  by  a
temporary banning on future employment  in the industry." 5 The supervision  agency should have the
proper regulatory and enforcement  powers, preferably including  the duty to act promptly according
to well specified triggers, and should also have adequate protection  against lawsuits.
The particular location, legal status, and scope of banking supervision  has been subject to
considerable  debate.  It is frequently discussed  whether bank supervision  should be located inside or
outside the central bank, what is the necessary and desirable degree of formal legal independence
(particularly when it is  located outside the  central  bank), and  whether it should be  formally
integrated with other supervisory  agencies, such as insurance and capital markets.
There  is still no consensus on whether banking supervision should be located inside the
central bank.  Advocates of supervision  inside the central bank point out the synergies between the
monetary policy and regulatory functions, the advantages of the independent status of the central
bank for the supervision  function, and the economies  of scale. The critics of this solution stress the
potential conflicts of interest that may  result from the  concentration of functions.  When the
supervision agency is located outside the central bank, there *is  an  awareness that  it must be
endowed with the necessary  regulatory and enforcement  powers, but again, there is no consensus on
whether it should have the same status of legal independence  usually enjoyed  by central banks.
More recently, there has been a growing discussion as to whether the different supervisory
agencies should be merged to form a  single integrated supervision.  Proponents of integrated
supervision point out the increase in the number of financial conglomerates accompanied by the
blurring  of  the  boundaries between products,  that  make  separate  supervisions increasingly
ineffective.  Thus, the proponents for integrated supervision argue that an integrated agency can
achieve  much greater efficiency  at supervision  at a much lower cost (for both the supervisor and the
supervised institutions), due to a number of factors, including: economies of scale and scope, a
sharp reduction in the duplication  of reporting requirements, more consistency in the treatment of
different sectors, more capacity  to solve conflicts, more accountability,  and much more capacity to
implement  a risk-based supervision  model (through which resources are allocated to the areas that
place the highest risk).  It is on the basis on these considerations  that 10 countries have already
adopted a full or partial integration  of their supervisory agencies.  16
Although it is generally recognized that the emergence of financial  conglomerates and the
blurring  of  differences across financial products  require  more  co-ordination and  sharing  of
information among supervisors, and possibly integration of some agencies and functions, there is
less consensus as to whether full integration  is required or even desirable.  These alternative views
stress that there  remain major differences between banks and other financial institutions in  the
is Senior  supervision  officials  in the US  and  the UK  are banned  from  banking  jobs for several  months
to reduce  the likelihood  of deferred  compensation  with  poor incentives  (Caprio  and  Honohan  (1999)).
16 Briault (1999) provides a strong case for integrated supervision,  and Taylor and Flemming (1999)
provide a  generally positive assessment of  the  experience with integrated supervision in  Scandinavian
countries.
11nature of their business, the structure of their assets and liabilities and the risks that they assume,
and these differences  justify a differentiated  approach to regulation  and supervision, although  with
all the appropriate  co-ordination  channels. 17
3.  The Regulation  and Supervision  of the Pension  Industry
3.1.  An Overview  of the Structure  of the Pension  Industry
As mentioned before, the financial problems faced by  most PAYG schemes around the
world has led most Governments  to reduce pension benefits and encourage supplementary  private
pension provision. In a few notable exceptions, such as the US, private pension arrangements  pre-
date public social insurance systems.  In the two last decades, several countries have taken an
additional step and  introduced a  second and  mandatory pillar.  Within the next  decades, the
mandatory and voluntary private pillars are expected to provide a significant share of retirement
income in many countries.  As a result, the there has been a growing interest in analyzing the
institutional  and regulatory framework of the pension industry, and assess whether the industry will
be able to fulfill its expected  role.
In examining  the pension fund industry, it is important to have in mind the great variety of
pension funds across countries, and even within one country.  There are defined benefit (DB) and
defined contribution (DC)  funds; closed (occupational) and  open funds;  funds constituted as
profit-oriented  joint stock companies and funds constituted as non-profit mutuals; funds with and
without boards, including  a variety of different rules on board composition within the first group;
and mandatory  and voluntary funds.  The existence of a great variety of funds is easily appreciated
by realizing  that there may be multiple combinations  of these different characteristics.
The paper will place more emphasis in the analysis of DC funds, because there has been a
general trend from DB to DC funds in most countries, and also because most of the new second
pillars that have been introduced  in the two last decades also operate on a DC basis.  However, the
paper will examine the different legal constructions of pension funds, as these differences have
important implications  for regulation  and supervision.
3.2.  Governance  Structures  for Pension Funds
In examining the governance structures of pension funds, it is useful to classify pension
funds into four broad classes: (i)  accounts in banks or  insurance companies; (ii) participating
endowment  insurance  funds;  (iii)  pension  funds  run  by  management  companies;  (iv)
foundations/trusts/mutuals. Most private pension arrangements fall into one of these four broad
classes, particularly into the last two classes. There are some additional arrangements, such as the
system of book reserves, but these types of arrangements  will not be examined, as they exist in a
very limited number of countries and are generally considered  as an unattractive  option.
Accounts in banks or insurance companies are common in most developed countries.  In
these countries, insurance companies  can run pension funds directly off their balance sheet, so that
the fund member has an insurance contract providing  their pension.  Some countries allow banks to
operate retirement savings accounts, which means pension assets are placed directly on the balance
sheet of the bank.  These funds are defined contribution  and are treated as essentially another form
'7  Goodhart  et  al  (1998) propose a system with six different  regulators  with clear mandates
(institutions  facing  systemic  risk such as banks, insurance,  retail  conduct  of business,  wholesale  conduct  of
business,  financial  exchanges,  and  competition);  Taylor  (1995)  proposes  a simpler  dual (twin  peaks)  model,
comprising  all prudential  regulation  in  one agency  and  conduct  of business  rules  in another.
12of deposit, although  several of them have additional restrictions, and performance  obligations (e.g.,
a minimum rate of return). In some circumstances, the only distinction  between pension accounts
and other accounts is the tax status of the account, with contributions and earnings on pension
accounts  shielded from income taxes until the funds are withdrawn after retirement.  Pension plan
members are not represented  in the boards of these institutions, unless they also happen to be their
shareholders.  They may be able to vote with their feet and change funds, although frequently
subject to  considerable restrictions and  penalties.  The  quality of  corporate governance and
management in these cases depends fundamentally  on the quality of the institutional  and regulatory
framework for insurance companies  and banks.  The lack of clear segregation  of assets or financial
product differentiation  is a key issue when regulatory regimes seek to impose enhanced  protections
in recognition of the additional social purposes that  distinguish retirement savings from other
depositors and contract holders.
Participating endowment insurance funds  are  allowed  in  some  OECD  countries and
contitute the third pillar in the Czech Republic.  This type of fund is constructed as a separate,
profit-oriented,  joint stock company, with shareholders  and plan participants. As in the case above,
there is a board, but plan participants  are not represented in the board, unless they also happen to be
shareholders. Also, plan members may be able to vote with their feet and change funds, although
usually subject to restrictions  and penalties. The quality of governance  and management  depends on
the legal and regulatory framework  for joint stock companies  in general, and for this type of fund in
particular.  This type  of construction is more  transparent than  simple policies or accounts in
insurance companies  and banks, as the fund is separately constituted.  However, this type of fund
also suffers from the problem of lack of asset segregation  (between participants  and shareholders).
Open funds without boards and run by a management company are the only permitted
structure  in most of Latin America. In other countries, this structure is permitted but is not the only
structure.  These funds operate essentially as mutual funds without voting rights. They are usually
sponsored  or effectively  managed by parent entities engaged primarily in financial services.  Their
primary purpose is investment  management  and maintenance  of individual  accounts. Typically they
invest directly their resources, making strategy and selection decisions in-house. They usually
perform all individual  account maintenance  functions, arrange for the transfer of balances, and often
serve as intermediaries  in the purchase of annuity contracts. Participants  are generally permnitted  to
switch accounts among a limited set of companies, resulting in a "managed competition" type of
market discipline. In some circumstances,  they are permitted to underwrite annuities.
These funds are invariably defined contribution, but the regulatory framework frequently
imposes some performnance  obligation on  the asset manager.  The quality of governance and
management depends fundamentally on  the  legal  and  regulatory  framework for  management
companies.  Where the management  company is a subsidiary of another financial institution (as is
conmmon  in Latin America), then the financial  institution  will regard the pension fumd  as just one of
its product offerings, and will market and manage it as such.  This means that any problems in the
parent institution  will affect the pension fund, and the regulator needs to recognize this link.  Fund
members do not have voting rights, as there are no boards, and are expected to exert discipline by
voting with their feet. Shifting  is usually allowed with few, if any, restrictions and penalties.
One of the advantages  of this type of construction, relative to the two described above, is
much greater transparency and clear asset segregation, as the assets of the pension fund must be
held separately from those of the management company.  The main problem observed in most
countries is the high pressure marketing techniques, high marketing costs, illegal selling practices,
and excessive switching (Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo (1999), Vittas (1998), and  Queiser
13(1998)).  Regulations  and supervisory activity have attempted to address these problems, but with
only limited success."
Foundation/Trusts/Mutuals  with boards are very common in the OECD, and are usually
occupational-based,  but  can  also  be  open.  Occupational plans  are  constituted as  trusts  or
foundations,  and are one of the main forms or pension provision in most developed countries. The
board is legally responsible for administering the fund, but does not typically directly engage in
management  activities.  These types of organizations are more characteristically  constituted as an
organizing nexus for members with some type of affiliation (an employer or trade union) with the
assets of the fund separated from the sponsor, and management and  administration  undertaken
through various contractual  arrangements. When of sufficient  size to be practical, some of the fund
management activities may be undertaken in-house.  Board members may be appointed by  an
employer, directly  by the members or through a trade union, or by both employers  and members.
Occupational  plans can be either defined benefit or defined contribution. In DC funds, the
employer's only obligation is to  contribute specified amounts to the pension fund.  Since the
employer does not have additional financial obligations, he may exercise little diligence in seeking
efficient fund management  or in properly matching the investment strategies with the requirements
associated with retirement savings.  However, this principal/agent problem is usually mitigated  by
at least three factors.  First, the senior management of the employer are usually members of the
plan, and have a strong interest in seeing that it is well managed, because it includes their own
retirement savings.  Second, employers typically compete in the labor market offering a benefit
package, and lose competitiveness  if the value of the pension benefits offered is discounted in
response to ineffectual  management. Third, the boards of many occupational  funds operating on a
DC basis have split board representations (employers and employees), contributing to  a better
alignment  of investment  policies with the interests  of plan members.
In DB funds, the employer normally guarantees the  defined benefit, and  also  usually
contributes to a general guaranty fund.  This gives the employer a strong financial interest in the
performance  of the fund, because poor performance will increase the employer's costs.  Whereas
this built-in incentive for performance may be a positive feature of these plans, there are also a
variety of problems associated  with DB plans.  These plans can be a significant source of rigidities
in  labor  markets,  as  employers  seek  to  bind  valued  workers  with  benefit  formulas that
disproportionately  value longer period of employment. Guarantees  can also create substantial  moral
hazard issues, particularly when the employer face significant liquidity or solvency problems.  In
such circumstances, the  employer may  undermine  the  funding status of the  arrangement by
promising  future benefits in lieu of cash wages, and fail to restore the financial  viability of the fund.
More seriously, senior management may take their benefits out of the fund before the employer
goes into liquidation. DB plans are generally more complex to regulate and supervise, and could
stretch the institutional  capacity of some emerging countries if implemented  on a large scale.
The potential  principal-agent  problem in occupational  funds may also depend  on whether the
plan is sponsored  by a single employer or by many employers. The presence of a single employer
as an interested  sponsor holding responsibility for the quality and results of asset management  has
often helped to ensure that these plans operate efficiently.  Multi-employer  occupational  plans may
prove more problematic. In contrast to single employer arrangements, in which the equity of the
sponsors can effectively substitute for  capital, some types of multi-employer plans may  lack a
Is  The two types of funds described above are also subject to high pressure marketing techniques
leading to large marketing costs, despite the fact that switching is more restricted than in the case of open
funds operated by a management  company.  Unfortunately,  there are no reliable empirical studies comparing
systematically  the costs of these three types of funds.
14financially liable and interested sponsor.  Although  the board of the plan may be held legally liable
for  the consequences of fraud and negligence, there may be no  practical mechanism to ensure
accountability  for their decisions, and to secure financial  assistance  from the sponsors.
Occupational funds  commonly utilize  other  intermediaries such as  banks,  insurance
companies and  mutual funds  to  obtain  bundled investment management services, or  engage
specialized managers who are delegated considerable discretion regarding strategic, selection and
trading decisions.  Regulatory regimes applied to this model focus on controlling  the nature of the
relationships and  transactions among the  various parties,  imposing standards of conduct, and
prohibiting conflicts of interest, rather than assessing compliance or imposing investment results.
Transparency and competition are often secondary considerations  to adaptability and operational
efficiency, derivative of the association  with voluntary systems  and employer  sponsorship.
Although the performance of occupational-based  funds may be affected by  a  potential
principal-agent  problem, the extent of this problem should not be exaggerated.  A serious problem
would have to be reflected sooner or later on the main performance indicators, namely, returns and
costs.  As shown in Figure 1, the average return of private pension funds in the UK, US, Ireland,
and the Netherlands (countries  where occupational  arrangements  dominate  the pension industry, and
where portfolio composition is subject to few restrictions)  have been comparable  or higher than the
returns generated by Chilean funds over the same period, especially if measured in relation  to wage
growth.  The returns in Switzerland  and Denmark were lower, but this was in part due to restrictive
investment  regulations, rather than governance  problems. '9
Figure 1: Pension Fund Returns  in Selected  OECD Countries
Real  Wage Growth  and  Real  Returns  on  Pension  Funds  (1984-1996)
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These  plans  also  operate  with  lower  costs  than  open  funds  operated  by  management
companies, largely because of the absence of marketing activities.  For example, in the UK the
Government estimates  that the administration  costs of open funds are more than five times as large
19  There are probably  other regulatory  factors  explaining  the relatively  low returns  in these  two
countries during this period.  For example, the guarantee  of a minimum 4 percent return may have led Swiss
funds to  adopt  conservative portfolio strategies during  this  period.  However, pressures for improved
performance  grew during the 1990s, resulting in increasing equity holdings and much higher returns among
Swiss funds.
15as those of occupational  plans.  In the US, many large employer-sponsored  pension funds operate
with investment management  expenses of less than 2/10th of one percent of assets annually (U.S.
Department of Labor (1998); Hustead (1998)).  Although some of the costs of occupational  plans
are hidden (subsidized  by the sponsor), these hidden costs probably pale in comparison with the
marketing  costs of open plans (Vittas (1998)).
Finally, in addition to trusts and foundations, there are also pension funds with boards
operating  on a mutual benefit  basis (the fund is a non-profit  entity and the board is elected from the
members).  This is the situation in Hungary, where both open and employer-based  funds operate
under this legal structure.  However, the existence of a board with legal obligations, does not
necessarily  imply that members are represented  and control the operation of the fund.  In the case
of the open funds, it is practically impossible  for the board to change the asset manager, because  the
asset manager dominates the board, and was the reason most of the members joined the fund in the
first place.  Therefore the open funds in Hungary operate defacto  like open funds without a board
and run by a management company (as in Latin America).  The employer-based funds resemble
more the Angle Saxon trusts, because of the closer link with a sponsoring employer, and a board
which may play a meaningful role.  However, the employer-based  funds account for a very small
share of the second  pillar.
3.3.  The Rationale  for Regulating  Pension Funds
The regulation of the pension industry is partly driven by the same general objectives  of
regulation in other segments of the financial sector-the  promotion of resource mobilization  and
allocation through a framework that ensures transparency, security and stability, minimizes  costs,
and  that  promotes  sound  investment decisions  (along  a  range  of  permissible  risk-return
combinations).  However, the regulatory framework for pension funds also needs to consider the
unique characteristics of these institutions, which derive from the special role that they play in
advancing  key social policy  objectives, such as the provision of retirement income.
Pension funds typically represent a greater portion of the household wealth of the average
participant and reach more deeply through socio-economic  strata than do other types of financial
intermediaries. This characteristic  is especially  relevant in circumstances  in which participation  in a
privately managed funded system is  mandatory (e.g.,  Argentina,  Australia, Chile,  Hungary,
Poland, Switzerland)  or quasi-mandatory  (e.g. Netherlands,  Denmark). However, even in countries
in which participation in a private pension is essentially voluntary, such as the US, pension funds
can also represent a large portion of household wealth (Gustan  and Steinmeir  (1998)).  The growing
importance  of private pension schemes in the provision of retirement income, and the recognition
that a major crisis in the industry could lead to pockets of poverty at old age and prompt calls for
large-scale  budgetary assistance  to the elderly, has provided a strong motivation  for the introduction
of prudential  regulation  and supervision.
In most countries, private pension arrangements have been encouraged by a preferred tax
treatment  to contributions  and investment income (in both the second and third pillars), effectively
making fiscal authorities  among the major "stakeholders" in a pension fund.  Ensuring the equity of
the distribution  of these subsidies  and protecting the value of the public "investment" contributes  to
the perceived need for  greater security in the  regulatory approach.  Their  critical role as an
instrument of social policy has also led to the emergence of a variety of guarantees, especially in
situations  where the overall institutional  and regulatory development  of capital markets is judged to
be deficient.  Guarantees directed toward social policy objectives which establish government
backed promises of rates of return or future benefit levels can create complex incentive structures
and moral hazard problems. Establishing a regulatory framework in conjunction  with guarantees is
one of the more complex  problems in regulating  pension funds.
163.4.  Identfting  the Risks of Pension Funds
As with any type of financial  institution, the regulation of pension funds originates with the
identification  and assessment of risks.  Although fund members are subject to a great variety of
risks, these risks can be grouped in three major classes, namely: (i) portfolio or investment  risk; (ii)
agency risks; (iii) systemic risks- 20
Portfolio risk contains unsystematic or diversifiable risk, and systematic or market risk.
Proper portfolio diversification would tend to eliminate the unsystematic risk, leaving only the
market risk.  One of the  main  objectives of regulation is to  ensure  that portfolios are  well
diversified, while also eliminating some very risky and illiquid assets from the range of investment
opportunities.  Plan members are still subject to the risk of fluctuations in the market, even after
proper diversification.  This could be due to a variety of factors, such as normal fluctuations in
asset prices, episodes of bubbles and crashes, and also unexpected  jumps in inflation. The exposure
to market risk tends to decline, the longer the time horizon and the holding periods, but an element
of risk always remains (Krishnamurthi (1999), Alier and Vittas (1999)).  There are proposals to
deal with market risk, but most of these proposals involve complications  and some negative side
effects (as examined  below).
Agency risks arise when the interests of fund administrators and asset managers are not
fully aligned with the interests of fund members.  The complex portfolio strategies associated  with
long  term  investment horizons,  the  informational asymmetries between  fund  managers and
members, and the low levels of legal and financial sophistication  of many fund members, create
room for incompetence,  inefficiencies, and abuse.  The types of agency risks depend in good part
on the legal and governance structure of pension funds (as described above), but all the these types
of funds are exposed, in one way or another, to agency risks.
The most immediate and  obvious agency risk is  the potential for  fraud,  misfeasance,
malfeasance, or outright theft of assets.  High visibility incidents such as the Maxwell case in the
U.K., the diversion of union pension funds in the U.S. by organized crime syndicates in the 60's
and early 70's,  and more recently the disappearance of self designated "pension funds"  in the
former Soviet Union have repeatedly  brought this problem into sharp focus.
The well publicized cases where the fund's assets are transferred to personal accounts in
exotic locations  are the most obvious  manifestations  of agency risk, but there are other, more subtle
channels, through which fund administrators  and asset managers can siphon value away from plan
members.  Self-investment, investment in  related  companies, directed fee  arrangements and
kickbacks are other examples. In these case, there may not be outright theft, but returns may prove
much lower than  in other  alternative investments with similar risk.  There  is also room for a
reduction in  returns and  benefits,  through large  overhead costs  and  fees.  There  are  many
opportunities for this problem in pension fund management  because of the multiple types of fees
that may be charged, including administrative, asset management, and transaction fees, as well
charges associated  with annuitization. Moreover, there are significant transparency issues in regard
to fees, because they are often netted against investment returns and concealed in financial  reports
or bundled with other services, obscuring the ability of members to make relevant comparisons.
Finally, systemic  risks arise from the links between the pension industry and other areas of
the financial  system (and the economy as a whole). Although  pension funds have minimal  liquidity
concerns related to a "run on the bank", they may be affected  by a banking crisis.  These crisis can
result in a sharp collapse in asset prices, affecting negatively some cohorts, and also lead to the
20 Srinivas,  Whitehouse,  and Yermo  (1999)  adopt  the same  classification.  See  also  OECD  (1998).
17insolvency  of several banks.  To the extent that fund managers are subsidiaries  of banks, there is an
overall erosion of capital protection  in the pension industry.  For the same reasons, the industry is
also subject to negative spillover  effects from other industries, such as insurance. Finally, a general
economic downturn can also deteriorate the financial status of sponsors (in occupational plans).
Among employer sponsored arrangements, sectoral losses in  employment leading to  early  or
bunched retirements  may result in payout requirements that are coincident  with negative investment
returns and a loss of contributions.
3.5.  The Regulation  of Pension Funds
Although private pension regulatory regimes are consistent in their attempt to address the
various risks identified above, there is extensive variation in the manner through which this is
accomplished. This variation originates with a number of factors, including  the historical evolution
of the system, the particular legal structure of the pension funds, the state of institutional and
regulatory development of capital markets, and of economic development in general, as well as
unique political and cultural environments. No simple descriptive framework can encompass the
richness of this variation. It is possible, however, to identify the main components of regulation
found in most countries. The typical components  of regulation  include:
*  Licensing (authorization)  Criteria
*  Governance  Rules
*  Asset Segregation  Rules
*  Independent  Custodian
*  External Audit/Actuary
*  Disclosure Requirements
*  Investment  Regulation
*  Guarantees
*  Minimum Capital and Reserves
*  Regulations  on Costs and Fees
Licensing criteria are adopted in most every country, although the conditions  for licensing
can differ substantially across countries and institutional  models.  Countries allowing only open
funds operated  by management  companies  generally  focus on the capital and professional  credentials
of the management company (which may  include the professional standing of the mother bank
and/or insurance company).  The supervisors in these countries typically seek to limit agency and
systemic risks by imposing extensive  licensing procedures in conjunction with capital and reserve
requirements, as well as "fit and proper" tests.  This limits entry to a relatively small number of
entities, making in depth oversight practical, and provides a significant source of security, albeit
possibly  at the cost of implicit  rents on capital.
Systems  utilizing  the  trust/foundation  approach  impose  less  stringent  qualification
requirements for fund managers (subsuming  these instead under the prudence standards), and rarely
require capital or reserves, although  they may verify the qualification  and reputation  of trustees, and
the business plan of the fund (e.g., indication of whether asset management  and administration  will
be external or internal, etc).  This aspect of regulation is approached in a more indirect manner,
through the disqualification of individuals with criminal records or the use of lifetime exclusion
from the pension industry as a  sanction for  the violation of pension laws.  This approach to
licensing is  a  reflection of the voluntary employment origins of the system, which relies on
minimizing  costs and entry barriers to attract participants. It also represents  an imnplicit  reliance on
the capital of sponsoring  employers  to secure assets.  Other methods, such as bonding requirements
in the U.S. for parties handling assets, and requiring approval by a regulatory agency to manage
funds, as is common  in Europe, are less restrictive  than those applied in Latin America.
18Governance  Rules.  In occupational funds, the boards usually play a number of important
strategic and oversight functions, setting broad investment strategies, and delegating responsibility
for the management  of funds to a range of service providers.  Clear rules on board composition,
voting rights, and duties and responsibilities  of board members, can help improve fund governance
and minimize agency risks.  In the US, pension fund trustees are appointed by employers (where
they are often senior officers of the sponsoring corporation) or employee organizations. The 1995
Pension Act in the UK has clarified and enhanced  the role of trustees and puts great emphasis on
education  of trustees. However, the importance  of the board in occupational  schemes in the OECD
also depends partly on the particular legal setting. Trust laws typically impose a greater reach of
personal liability for  responsible parties than do  cornmercial codes, often penetrating corporate
liability shields and permitting the attachment of  personal property.  Broader application of
criminal penalties is also used for deterrent and remedial purposes.  In continental  Europe, several
countries attempt to reduce agency risk by mandating  split representations  in the boards.
In open funds operated by  management companies, the  governance rules apply to  the
management companies themselves, as the funds typically have  no  boards.  The management
companies must be exclusively dedicated to pension fund management; they  cannot delegate or
sub-contract  their management  functions; and they can each manage only one pension fund.  The
quality of governance  depends in great part on the quality of the rules on the boards of management
companies  (e.g. rules on self-dealing  and conflicts  of interest, rules establishing  the responsibility  of
board members, rules exposing  board members to personal liability).  In the countries where open
funds have  boards (e.g.  Hungary),  the  board  is  typically dominated and  appointed by  the
management company and plays a  more  limited role in practice.  In this  case, the quality of
governance  will be critically determined  by the rules applying  to the management  company.
Asset segregation rules aim at  separating the pool of fund assets from the assets of the
sponsor/management  company, in order to protect members' balances and vested rights, and limit
systemic  and agency risks.  Asset segregation is obtained by construction in open funds operated by
management companies, and is also obtained in most occupational funds through the requirement
that assets be held in a specifically  defined and separate legal entity such as the Anglo-American
construct of a trust fund (except  for the book reserve system, which requires insolvency  insurance).
Asset segregation  does not hold in pension plans operated internally by insurance companies  and/or
banks (nor in endowment insurance funds).  Although good prudential regulation of banks and
insurance companies  should protect the assets of plan members, there is definitely more scope for
negative spillovers  from banking and insurance crisis (systemic risk) in these cases.
External custodian  rules are also essential to limit agency risks.  Under adequate custodian
arrangements, the administration  of the fund and/or asset managers never directly hold legal title to
the assets of the pension fund, limiting the opportunities for fraud and theft by requiring that a
separate party with defined responsibilities  be required to execute all transactions.  Custodians can
also  help  enforce  prudential  regulations, by  refusing  to  effectuate transactions that  violate
investment guidelines and other rules.  For the custodian protection to be effective, however, it
must control the flow of payments  from members to the funds/asset  managers without interruptions.
Some systems  allow gaps in such a control, opening room for misappropriation  of funds.
Disclosure requirements  involve a number of important rules, such as asset valuation rules,
the frequency of asset valuation, and the distribution of relevant information (e.g., returns, costs,
levels of capital and reserves)  to fund members and the general public. Disclosure requirements are
generally regarded as an essential component of regulation across all the sectors of the financial
system.  The  banking  sector  in  most  countries has  been  subject to  increasing disclosure
requirements in  the recent decades, as  an attempt to  improve the level of information among
19depositors, reduce agency risks, and enhance market discipline.  In the pension industry, however,
disclosure  requirements vary substantially  across  countries and models.
Disclosure requirements  are very important  in mandatory  DC schemes, particularly schemes
allowing unrestricted individual  choice.  Open funds in most Latin American countries are subject
to extensive disclosure requirements, which usually include daily asset valuation on a  "mark to
market"  basis,  account statements made available to members several times  a  year,  and  the
publication  of extensive  and detailed information  on the industry by the supervision  agency, through
quarterly and annual bulletins.  Such an extensive disclosure of information is designed to enable
workers to make informed choices and to put competitive  pressure on asset managers, and also to
allow switching on a fair basis (the balances of workers leaving a  fund should reflect all capital
gains and losses, realized and unrealized, and marked to market).  The disclosure requirements
themselves are an attractive feature of these systems, although  the extensive switching  across funds
seems to be more driven by marketing  efforts than by objective comparisons of returns and costs
(Queiser  (1998), Vittas (1998), Srinivas,  Whitehouse  and Yermo (1999)).
Disclosure requirements in OECD countries are generally less extensive. In some countries,
regulators impose disclosure of information,  but mostly through annual reporting, and also permit
greater discretion in terms of valuation. The reliability  of these reports is assessed through external
independent  audit requirements, because it is not feasible to review the large number of regulated
entities. In some countries there are no legal requirements  to disclose information  (OECD (1998)).
The  less  extensive disclosure requirements in  the  OECD  derives probably from  the
occupational  nature of the pension industry.  Funds are less pressed to publish frequent  and detailed
individual statements in systems that restrict individual switching.  It has also been argued that
under these systems, there may also be a rationale  for allowing  some deviation  from mark to market
valuation rules.  Valuation techniques  based on projected revenues from assets and other interest
accrual methods smooth fluctuations  in asset prices and may enable funds to hold a larger share of
equity in their portfolios.  Thus, it has been argued that this is one the reasons why British funds
generally held more equity and obtained higher returns (OECD (1998)).  More flexible valuation
regimes also permit the holding of non-publicly  traded assets such as real estate or venture capital,
for which frequent valuation would be expensive and contribute little to an evaluation of a fund's
financial status.  If properly managed, holding these types of assets may enhance long term yields
and help diversify risks over the timne  horizons appropriate  to pension funds.
Despite these justifications for more flexible disclosure rules in occupational funds, it is
surprising that some OECD countries  do not impose any legal obligation to disclose information, as
members must be informed about the situation of the fund, in order to be able to exert discipline
and control over the fund's situation, and reduce agency risks, irrespective of whether the fund is
occupational  or not, and whether it operates  on a DB or DC basis.
External Audits of  pension fund accounts  are required in every country, although  the scope
and quality of external audits may vary substantially  from country to country.  The legal duties and
responsibilities  of extemal auditors may also vary substantially  across countries. In underdeveloped
legal and institutional  environments,  the external audits do not provide an independent  and objective
assessment of the fund's situation, and the legal responsibilities  of auditors are not clear and/or
enforceable.  In other countries, external audits not only provide an accurate and  independent
assessment, but also constitute the most important tool of supervision.  Auditors are required to
report any problems to the supervisor and are legally liable for the failure to do so.  External
actuaries play a similar role in DB schemes  or DC schemes  with guarantees.
20Investment  Regulations.  The stated objective of investment  regulations in most countries is
to  ensure diversification and minimize agency,  systemic and,  especially, portfolio risks.  The
regulations typically involve ceilings on  holdings by issuer, by  type of  instrument, by  risk, by
concentration  of ownership, and by asset class.  Whereas the first four restrictions  are considered  as
non-controversial prudential rules  and are  adopted in one  formn  or  another in  most countries,
restrictions by  asset class constitute one particular area of  regulation that has  generated more
controversy.
There is a group of OECD countries that does not impose restrictions by asset class, other
than the prescription that the portfolio be managed prudently.  The regulatory framework in these
countries (which are mostly the Anglo-Saxon  countries and the Netherlands)  are said to follow the
"prudent man" rule.  It  simply requires that those responsible make investment decisions while
exercising diligence and expertise  and considering the specific circumstances  of the fund.  The usual
adjunct is a  general dictate for diversification and a  duty of loyalty (sole consideration of the
members'  interests).  This  rule  is  usually  construed  to  permit  consideration of  individual
investments  in the context of their  role in the larger portfolio, thus permitting high risk assets to be
included in a pension portfolio so long as the risk is hedged elsewhere  in the portfolio.
On the other hand, a second group of OECD countries and all Latin American countries
impose restrictions by  asset class.  Investment regulation in these countries has been labeled as
quantitative", or "draconian" (OECD (1998), Vittas (1998), Queiser (1998), Srinivas, Whitehouse
and Yermo (1998)).21 These regulations typically specify  the maximum amount that pension funds
can invest by asset class, although some countries also specify ceilings on individual assets, and
even minimum  holdings  of assets (typically Government  bonds).
There is evidence that real returns of pension funds in prudent man environments  have been
higher than the returns of funds operating  in more restrictive environments,  essentially because of a
larger share of equity in their portfolios (OECD (1998), Davis (1995 and  1997)), although the
difference  cannot be entirely explained  by investment  restrictions,  because these were not binding in
many countries.  It is clear that investment restrictions may be in principle counterproductive,  as
they may prevent diversification and expose fund members to a greater degree of portfolio risk.
However, it is also understood that investmnent  restrictions may be initially justified in countries
with underdeveloped  institutional  and regulatory structures, and shallow/illiquid  asset markets.  The
"draconian" approach is also simple and easy to police.  The prudent person approach requires a
greater element of judgement by the supervisor, and necessitates  a substantial interpretive effort to
assist practitioners in understanding  how the general principles will be applied.  It is consequently
associated with greater uncertainty for all parties.  While in principle it should preclude outlying
investment behavior, in practice the courts in the United States have been reluctant to reverse even
highly risky investment  behavior solely on the basis of prudence, unless losses have been realized.
The literature on pension fund regulation generally concludes that investment restrictions
may be initially justified in emerging countries introducing private pension schemes, particularly
those introducing  a mandatory second pillar.  However, there is also a consensus on the need for
these countries to relax the restrictions over time, in line with the development  of institutions  and
instruments, improvements in the depth and liquidity of securities  markets, and also improvements
in the overall legal framework.  The long run objective would be the adoption of the prudent man
approach, where minimal  restrictions are imposed.  The experience  of Chile in this area is regarded
as a positive example  for other reforming countries.
21  The OECD  (1998a)  and (1998b) provides an extensive and detailed comparison of investment
regulations in OECD countries.  Srinivas, Whitehouse  and Yermo (1999)  provide a similar comparison for
Latin American  countries.
21A more recent and controversial issue in the area of investment regulation relates to the
debate on single versus multiple portfolios.  The portfolios of pension funds in most countries are
already reasonably diversified, and the degree of diversification has been increasing, with the
relaxation of investment restrictions in many countries and the increase in the share of equity and
foreign assets (De Ryck (1997), Davis (1997), OECD (1998)).  However, it has been argued that
the overall degree of diversification is still insufficient, because the portfolio composition  across
funds tends to be similar, due to a strong herding effect. 22 Even in countries where switching is
allowed, workers do not have a meaningful  choice between  risk-return combinations,  because  all the
available portfolios are essentially identical.  Thus, young and old workers are forced to hold the
same portfolio, which is sub-optimal for both, as young workers would favor portfolios which
exploit risk and liquidity premiums (i.e. with a larger share of equity), and older workers require
portfolios with less risk and greater liquidity (those with a larger share of short-term, fixed income
assets).  Although  several pension funds calibrate their investment  policies to the average age of the
fund members, it could be argued that the portfolio would still be sub-optimal  for members of
different ages.  To help solve this problem, it has been proposed that workers be offered a choice of
more than one portfolio (e.g. SriniVas,  Whitehouse  and Yermo (1998)).
Whereas  the theoretical merits of multiple  portfolios can be clearly appreciated, the question
is to extent to which the welfare gains would offset the costs.  It  is generally recognized that
multiple portfolios would tend to increase the costs of administration  and compliance.  Although
these costs would tend to decrease with developments in electronic technology, they could still
prove a  burden in some emerging countries.  Second, the welfare gains depend on how many
individuals  are effectively constrained  by the single portfolio.  High income individuals  are clearly
not, as they have a large volume of individual savings, and can build their own voluntary asset
portfolios in a way that offsets any constraints imposed by the single mandatory portfolio.  Low
income individuals do not have individual savings to offset these constraints, but the retirement
income of low income workers in most countries comes primarily from first pillar (PAYG)  benefits.
The welfare gains from multiple portfolios would be relatively modest in these cases.  Therefore,
the welfare gains would be concentrated in the average income individuals and  could still be
substantial  or not, depending  on the size of mandatory  portfolios in total pension wealth (including
the first pillar benefits), the extent to which these individuals  are already offsetting  these restrictions
through voluntary savings, and on income (and age) distribution.
Finally, the gains would also depend on whether individuals  would make informed  decisions
about the composition  of their portfolios.  In this regard, the experience  with 401(k) plans in the
US, which now typically provide at least four to five choices to participants, is rather mixed.
Although it is reassuring that the share of equity is negatively correlated with age, the patterns of
asset composition can still differ significantly from prior expectations (Srinivas, Whitehouse  and
Yermo (1999)).  Market surveys of workers participating in these plans also indicate that the
average level of financial  sophistication  is rather low (Vittas  (1998) and Franz et al (1997)).
Despite  these mixed results, a system  offering multiple  portfolios  can still  be seen as a very
elegant and efficient  construction in sophisticated  environments,  and within the context of voluntary
arrangements. To  be effective, it requires the development of  a  regulatory framework which
allocates liability for  investment decisions between members directing their accounts and fund
administrators  conducting all the other activities,  which imposes  substantial  new layer of complexity
on any system.  It also requires an extensive and ongoing  program of education for fund members.
Both of these considerations  limit the applicability  to well developed systems serving sophisticated
populations.  Introducing  multiple  portfolios  in  mandatory  pillars  and  less  sophisticated
22 Herding is stronger in Latin America, possibly because of the effect of guarantees (as discussed
below), but is also observed in the OECD, even among countries following  the prudent man rule.
22environments requires a more careful assessment of costs and benefits.  This issue is examined
again in the discussion  of guarantees  on second  pillar benefits.
Guarantees.  Most countries that have introduced a second, mandatory pillar, have also
been induced to offer some form of guarantee on  second pillar returns.  In Latin America and
Central Europe, most minimum  return guarantees have been expressed in relative terms, although
there have been several variations around this theme.  These minimum return guarantees have been
defined relative to the average return of all pension funds, to a broader market benchmark, or to a
combination  of both.  They can also be expressed in nominal or real terms.  For example, Chilean
funds have to achieve a  minimum return equal to 50 percent of the average real return of the
industry, and Argentine funds must achieve a minimum return equal to 70 percent of the average
nominal return of the industry). 25 These guarantees are usually backed by the minimum reserves
and equity imposed on the asset manager.  The level of minimum reserves are usually stated as a
fraction (1-2 percent) of the size of assets under management. In the case of insolvency  of the asset
manager, there is usually an explicit  guarantee from the budget.
Other countries have introduced minimum absolute rates of retum,  expressed either  in
nominal or real terms.  Switzerland  provides a minimum nominal return of 4 percent p.a.,  backed
by a central guarantee fund.  This guarantee has amounted to a minimum real return of around 2
percent per year, given the low levels and the stability of inflation in Switzerland (in many other
countries this guarantee would not be meaningful).  Hungary has introduced a  minimum second
pillar benefit which is defined in relation to the first pillar benefit.  This benefit can be expressed in
terms of a minimum rate of return, although the rate of return is age-specific.  Under baseline
assumptions,  this guarantee is equal to a reasonable 0 percent real. rate of return for young workers,
calculated over the working life, but a  much more ambitious 4  percent real rate of return for
workers in their forties.  The guarantee  is backed by a central guarantee fund, and the imposition of
minimum reserves on the pension funds.  The minimum reserve of pension funds is used when the
retums are lower than 85 percent of a benchmark  portfolio.  Uruguay has introduced a scheme that
implies de facto a minimnum  real rate of return of 2 percent.
The introduction  of guarantees always raises three inter-related  questions.  The first is the
types of risk that the guarantee  is expected to cover.  The question here is whether the guarantee is
excessive  or not.  The second is the amount of capital backing the guarantee. The critical issue here
is whether the capital buffer is consistent  with the probability of the guarantee  being called and the
size of the exposure.  The third is the changes in behavior triggered by the guarantee.  The key
issue is the extent to which  the guarantee itself modifies  behavior in perverse ways (moral hazard).
Relative guarantees such as those introduced in Latin America attempt to deal primarily
with incompetent/inefficient  asset management, fraudulent behavior and other agency risks.  They
do  not attempt to deal with market risk.  Also, the typical construction in Latin America puts
private capital at risk in some relation with the exposure (i.e. the reserves and equity of the asset
manager are  a  fraction of  the  assets managed) before the  Government guarantee is  called.
Therefore, the guarantee is not overly generous, and does not seem to induce excessive risk-taking
behavior by asset managers.  The problem that has been observed in Latin America is the herding
behavior of pension funds-as  mentioned  before, herding in Latin America seems more intense than
herding among pension funds in the OECD. 24
23  Vittas (1995 and 1998), Queiser (1998) and Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo (1999) provide a
description  of guarantees  in  Latin  American  countries  and  some  CEE  countries.
24 The interesting  question  is whether  herding  is indeed  a problem,  when  portfolios  are similar  but
well-diversified.
23Absolute guarantees such as  those introduced in  Switzerland and,  to  some extent in
Hungary, attempt to  deal  with market  risk  as  well, by  introducing some measure of  inter-
generational risk pooling (as  in DB schemes). Both countries back this guarantee by  a  central
guarantee fund (supported  by mandatory contributions  from all pension funds), but without putting
private capital at risk first.  Swiss funds are not forced to constitute minimum reserves or capital.
Hungarian funds are forced to hold minimum reserves of 0.5  percent of the size of individual
accounts, but these reserves are imposed at the level of the fund itself, not the asset manager.
These constructions  are in principle flawed, because they provide access to the resources  of
a central guarantee fund without putting private capital at risk first.  The scheme has operated in
Switzerland, apparently without major problems, partly because of the implicit links with the
sponsor and the reputation and goodwill factors.  Single employer funds usually provide resources
required for the fund to  reach the minimum 4 percent (sometimes pressed by  the supervisory
authority), and open funds (managed by insurance companies  or banks) also provide the resources
necessary for the ftnd to reach the minimum, in order to safeguard  their reputation. Therefore, the
system seem to operates relatively well without explicit legal backing, because of recourse to more
implicit forms of private capital protection.
In the case of Hungary, the guarantee is less generous for younger workers, but more
generous for older workers.  It is fortunate that most of the workers in the new Hungarian system
are under the age of 35, but the probability that workers in their forties will trigger the guarantee  is
not negligible.  As mentioned before, the other problem is that the minimum reserves have been
imposed at the level of the pension fund, not the asset manager.  If these reserves need to be used,
they may be replenished  from new contributions,  rather from the resources of the asset manager.  It
could be argued that, by imposing this potential burden on future contributions, the fund members
will be  induced to exert more discipline on  the asset managers.  However, the asset manager
himself does not have to bear direct consequences  for excessive risk-taking behavior.  Therefore,
this construction also depends on more implicit links with the sponsors, which are large companies
in the case of occupational-based  funds, or large financial groups (banks and insurance companies)
in the case of open funds.  Although these sponsors are usually well established  organizations  with
their reputation at stake, and will probably provide backing to their pension funds, the protection
still lacks a more explicit legal base.
Capital/Reserve  Requirements.  The notion of capital does not have meaning in funds
constituted as trusts, foundations and mutuals, as these legal entities do not have shareholders,
although the liability assigned to the sponsors of these arrangements often serves as a proxy.  In
pure DC schemes  providing no minimum  returns there is no rationale  to constitute  capital, except in
the form of voluntary reserves, agreed by the members and designed to smooth fluctuations in
yearly returns.  DC schemes may also voluntarily adopt portfolio  strategies that involve an implicit
target  rate of  return and  smoothing of  short-term returns.  This  can be  achieved by  use  of
immunization  strategies that smooth the impact of short-term fluctuations in interest rates, and/or
use of directives to limit the impact of equity  price fluctuations  on the pension fund.
If the fund has an explicit obligation  to produce minimum  returns, then it becomes  essential
to impose capital requirements commensurate  with the obligation. As mentioned before, in Latin
America these requirements are  imposed on the management company.'  Two countries with
25 The  funds  in Chile  and Argentina  also  have  a "profitability  reserve"  a the level  of the pension  fund
itself (not the asset manager).  This  reserve is accumulated  in periods of high returns and used in periods
where  returns  fall  below  the minimum.  However,  most  funds  to not  have  large  profitability  reserves,  because
of the herding  effect. In any case, the capital  protection  is expected  to be provided  primarily  by the asset
managers' compulsory  reserves and capital.
24mandatory DC schemes have  constituted central guarantee schemes to which all funds have to
contribute. The asset managers/management  companies  in these countries do not need to constitute
capital and reserves.  The foundations in Switzerland do not need to constitute reserves either,
whereas the Hungarian mutuals do.  The Hungarian construction is possibly slightly better than the
Swiss, as it signals to fund members that they need to exert discipline on the asset manager.
However, in neither country  asset managers/sponsors  have their capital explicitly  at risk.
Restrictions on fees  are  a  common feature in  Latin American and  Eastem  European
systems.  Chile, for example,  permits only certain categories  of fees, prohibiting  exit charges, asset
based  management fees and  performance fees.  Commissions for  selling agents and  annuity
conversions  on the other hand are held to a prescribed level. Hungary places limits on the fees that
the fund may charge for administration but places no  specific limits on what it may pay  asset
managers.  Trust based systems  generally do not explicitly  regulate fees.  In the US, fee levels are
regulated indirectly through  the general prudence requirements  through a provision in the law which
specifies  only that they be "reasonable".
It is debatable whether regulation  of fees in the pension industry (and in the financial  sector
more generally) can be enforced, and whether it produces the desired effects (assuming that they
can be enforced). Regulation  of costs may lead to shifting  costs to other unregulated categories  and
a loss of transparency.  Prescribed limits may also result in a clustering of expenses at maximum
and have been perceived as anti-competitive. The reasonableness  approach, on the other hand, is
difficult to enforce especially because it is associated with system with many funds (700,000 in the
U.S.), and is a weak constraint on the inherent agency problems  of an employment  based system.
3.6.  The Supervision  of Pension Funds
The Supervision  of pension funds incorporates the same three basic aspects relevant to the
oversight of banks discussed in the previous section, namely: (i) ex-ante licensing activities, (ii)
ongoing monitoring and inspections, and (3) remedial and punitive problem resolution.  However,
consistent with the greater diversity of system designs and regulatory approaches outlined above,
there is considerably  greater variation in these supervision  programs than among bank supervisors.
In general, the pension supervisory programs reflect the regulatory frameworks which they  are
designed  to implement.
In this respect, supervision  of pension funds may generally be categorized  as following two
basic models. The first of these is associated  with systems  based on a small number of open funds,
such as those operating  in most Latin American countries. Supervision  of these systems emphasizes
the first two supervisory "building blocks", by limiting participation in the system to entities that
meet strict  structural standards, supported by  close and  direct monitoring of  their status and
activities through extensive  reporting requirements. This approach is closer to the bank supervision
model followed in most countries, through its reliance on strict adherence  to stringent regulations in
order to pre-empt potential  problems.
These Latin American systems are often characterized as pro-active in  regard to  their
compliance activities (Vittas, (1998), De Marco,  Rofman, and Whitehouse (1998)).  A  small
number of large funds facilitates  this pre-emptive approach  to compliance. The supervisory agency
plays a major role in reviewing and approving licenses  to operate a pension fund, which then may
require periodic  renewals necessitating considerable interaction with  the  supervisor.  This  is
achieved by  extensive off-site analysis and on  site reviews on a  regular basis with authorities,
maintaining continuous contact with funds in an attempt to  prevent deviations from prescribed
standards.  This approach is generally associated with extensive reporting requirements, in some
25cases on a daily basis.  The pro-active model is one in which supervisors take a more directive and
interventionist  stance rather, than focus on corrective actions. 26
The alternative model has been labeled as re-active, and is associated with systems that
utilize the Trust/Foundation form of organization. These are systems which are typically  voluntary
and employment based, with a large number of funds operating as intermediate vehicles for the
investment  and collection of  funds.  Investment  management  is often conducted on a contractual
basis through other types of financial service organizations.  Supervision and enforcement within
this model is labeled as reactive, because the supervisor usually intervenes only when problems are
reported, either by trustees, fund members, external auditors, actuaries, or other relevant players
(including other supervisors).  Pension supervision is more remedial in nature, or more oriented
toward the third element of problem resolution.  The system essentially relies on  other active
players monitoring  the funds, and also on credible deterrents to violations  of the laws.
This fundamental difference  in  these styles of  supervision originates from  the  basic
organization  of the industry.  Among the most important  of these are the number of funds, the less
intrusive practices in occupational-based  systems, and the level of development  of capital markets
and legal systems. Of particular significance  is the management  of assets via other highly regulated
financial intermediaries  (banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses) and the development of
independent  financial auditing institutions and practices.  The nature of pension funds as second
levels of intermediation  enables regulators to rely more on other supervisory institutions  to provide
the first  line of defense against fraudulent  practices. While in some respects this narrows the range
of the supervisors activities, it creates an additional need for them to  coordinate with different
authorities.  A  tradition of  independent audits with a  high degree of  integrity also permits
supervisory authorities  to rely on this mechanism  for monitoring, and deploy their resources  toward
corrective  actions.  As with regulatory frameworks, a key differentiation  in the applicability  of these
models is the level of development  of the economy.  A reactive approach is only feasible in the
context of developed economies  with well established  and reliable financial  and legal institutions.
Despite the importance  of supervisory institutions and programs to the security of private
pension system, at present there is very little literature on the various institutional  arrangements  and
operations  of supervisory agencies. The methods in use, however, may be generally categorized  as
follows.
Licencing of Funds.  The range of methods for the approval of  funds to operate is one of
the more widely varied areas of supervision. In Latin American countries, with systems  based on a
small number of open funds, the licencing of funds constitutes  one of the primary activities of the
supervisory agencies, which may often have a distinct unit devoted to this process.  Prior to the
granting of  licences, funds are  required to  provide extensive documentation regarding their
compliance with minimum capital levels, reserves or other financial criteria.  The legal form of
organization of the fund management, business and marketing plans,  investment  policies and the
qualifications  of relevant staff are scrutinized, to assess a priori the adherence to the requirements
prescribed by the  law and regulations.  This extensive process sets the stage for  the ongoing
relationship  with supervisory  authorities.
Representing the other end of the spectrum, countries such as the United States do not
require any specific  license for employer-sponsored  pension funds. The requirements to operate are
indirectly established, through requirement of written documents  that set forth terms of the trust,
benefit formulas and designate individuals with specific responsibilities.  These are essentially
26  For a more extensive  description  of pro-active  supervisory  systems  see Demarco,  Rofman  and
Whitehouse  (1998)
26constructed as standards governing a private transaction in a manner analogous to a commercial
code, and are not required to be submitted to any government authority for approval, only to be
made available to participants and supervisory authorities on request.  The only action similar to
licensing is the application of preferential tax treatment to the appropriate tax authorities, which
although commonly  done is also discretionary. Many other OECD countries fall within this range.
Common practices require application for licensing to the relevant authorities, but on many cases
these resemble more a simple registration process.  Hungary and Poland have essentially adopted
the Latin American approach with extensive requirements, while Australia requires no license for
the fund to operate, but requires approval  of the trustees.
Monitoring  and Inspection.  The core of most supervisory programs is in the monitoring of
the activities of funds.  These comprise two main forms of activity: the review of reports on the
financial status of  pension funds (off-site surveillance), and  the  conduct of  on-site reviews.
Reporting requirements vary widely in their frequency and depth, but are generally maintained  by
most supervisory agencies.  This  serves the  dual  purpose of  providing data  for  compliance
assessment  and exposing funds to scrutiny to achieve  a deterrent effect. In pro-active  environments,
supervisors utilize reports to monitor portfolio composition and other structural requirements in
effectively a  'real  time" environment, taking pre-emptive action on the basis of the information.
Supervisors operating in the reactive mode generally receive financial  reports after more extended
periods, often annually, and use the data to select funds with indications of potential problems for
more in depth review.  A common role of supervisory agencies is also to make financial  and other
data about fund operations  accessible to members.  In Hungary, the supervisory agency actually is
responsible  for assembling  and providing some reports to members to ensure their validity.
On-site inspections  are often the most visible element of a supervision program.  Virtually
all legal systems  provide supervisors with the authority to access all the records and examine other
relevant materials on site.  Supervisory agencies will typically devote substantial resources to these
kinds of activities. Differences lie in the objectives, scope and frequency of these reviews.  Pro-
active systems structure these reviews as audits, in which there is a systematic  attempt to review all
aspects of the funds activities, tracing contributions through to individual accounts, verifying the
completeness and  accuracy of  financial statements, and  evaluating adherence  to  investment
limitations and other requirements.  These audits are undertaken on a  regular schedule, with all
funds reviewed  on at least annually, with the objective of making a full assessment  of compliance.
Alternatively, re-active arrangements structure reviews essentially as an investigation of
specific issues, often conducting  on site inspection  on an ad hoc basis in response to a complaint or
specific indication of a problem. These specific and in-depth investigations may include a set of
transactions, the flow of individual  contributions, or fee arrangements. without initially attempting
to provide a comprehensive  review.  However, once such a review is initiated, it often leads to the
examination  of other issues.  This mode is in part a practical response to the need to cover a large
universe of funds with limited resources, but it also reflects the reliance on independent  auditors to
undertake reviews of the overall integrity of financial data.  Programs that primarily operate as
"investigations" will also undertake a  certain random  component, designed to provide a  cost
effective deterrence presence.  In  these  kinds of  regimes, establishing effective systems for
processing complaints, and developing algorithms for the automated review of annual reports are
critical to the success of the endeavor.  In the United States, programs to assist participants in
resolving  benefit  disputes have proven to be an effective  source of targeting inspections.
Problem Resolution.  The application of sanctions for remedial and punitive purposes is
usually the most difficult part of any supervisory program.  In countries employing  more pro-active
systems there is a  heavy emphasis on pre-emptively addressing compliance issues, by providing
supervisory agencies the  authority to  direct  funds to  make changes in  their  operations. The
27corrective actions in re-active  systems  more closely resemble civil or commercial  legal proceedings.
In these systems, letters or more formal legal complaints are more likely to be the predicate to
corrective action.  Although this  approach may  be  structured to  more  closely resemble an
adversarial legal proceeding, in practice the  majority of  cases may be  settled voluntarily. In
addition, some supervisors, perhaps most notably the  Netherlands, have also relied  on  moral
suasion in the form of exposing problem institutions to bad publicity, which has apparently been
effective in correcting problems.  Virtually all systems provide access to the courts to resolve the
most contentious  problems, and provide a check on the authority  of the supervisors.
Sanctions  available  to supervisors  include removal of persons from positions  of authority in
funds, their permanent exclusion  from involvement  in pension fund business, and the  unwinding of
transactions deemed inappropriate.  Restitution of losses, fines, and criminal penalties for more
egregious problems are also  typically available to  supervisors, although the  authority for  the
application  of these may be separated  from the supervisory agency. Systems  which impose reserve
and capital requirements impose charges against these as well.  Providing individual  members with
access to the courts to pursue financial remedies for individual  losses is also commonly an adjunct
to the activities  of supervisors.
A final key aspect of supervision is the placement of the authority.  While all approaches
necessitate  political independence in the regulation  of pension funds, there are systemic  differences
in the placement of this authority.  Latin American countries have generally established  what are
effectively independent institutions, reflecting the  underlying construct of  pension funds  as
effectively stand alone special purpose financial institutions.  Most others have established the
authority as a distinct unit within a larger public institution, placing regulators under the broader
auspices most commonly  of Finance or Labor Ministries, or Insurance Regulatory  Authorities  (see
OECD (1998)).  Two recent Eastern European reforms (Poland and Hungary) have essentially  split
the  difference,  creating  supervisory authorities  that  operate  with  a  reasonable  degree  of
independence, but that ultimately report to  Ministries.  Consolidating regulators is  a  greater
imperative in systems that are more interactive with other regulated financial  intermediaries. The
integration  of supervision  activities in the U.K. and some Scandinavian  countries represent perhaps
that furthest  extent to which this concept has been advanced.
4.  Scope for Improvements and Possible Lessons  from the Banking Industry
4.1.  The Exposure  of Banks and Pension Funds to a Systemic  Crisis
Before examining the  scope for  improvements in  pension regulation, and  the possible
lessons from the banking sector, it is useful to review some of the major differences  between  banks
and pension funds.  As mentioned before, banks are highly leveraged, involved in substantial
maturity transformation,  and hold assets that are difficult to value and monitor.  As a result, banks
are subject to a variety of risks, such as credit, liquidity, interest rate, and currency risks.  Banks
are also subject to inside abuse, fraud, and other agency risks.  The high leverage in banking and
the structure of bank liabilities, imply a  substantial degree of exposure to these risks, and the
possibility  of contagion effects triggering a chain of bank runs and failures.
Pension funds  function with  substantially longer time  periods than  banks and  other
intermediaries, with  the typical participant having a  relevant investment horizon measured in
decades rather than months or years.  They are also prohibited, with relatively  few exceptions,  from
borrowing  and  leveraging their  portfolios.  Both  of  these  tend  to  minimize their  liquidity
requirements.  Pension funds are almost exclusively engaged in portfolio optimizing strategies
which focus on diversification, selection and  exploiting time period premia, rather than those
directed toward interest rate spreads or the management  of liquidity  exposure.
28Although systems subject to extensive switching across funds (as those in Latin America)
may shorten the time horizon somewhat  and create the need for some additional liquidity, it remains
true that pension funds are not subject to  contagion effects and runs,  at  least not directly.  In
systems  dominated by occupational funds there is little, if any, risk of massive withdrawals  in the
presence of a crisis in the financial sector.  In systems dominated by  open funds there can be in
principle withdrawals  from individual  funds, but not from the system  as a whole.  Systemic failures
are not likely for the same reason, except in the hypothetical case where the funds are subject to
high minimum returns imposed on  an annual basis and there is a  major capital market crash,
depressing asset prices substantially  and for a protracted period.  No country seems to be exposed  to
this type of extreme situation. These are very fundamental  differences between banks and pension
funds that determine major differences between the two regulatory frameworks (the imposition of
liquidity requirements, access to  lender of last resort facilities, the complex machinery of loan
classification  and provisioning, and the complex  measurement  of capital are just a few examples).
At the same time, while pension funds are not subject to systemic runs and failures, they
can still suffer the effects of a major financial crisis in other ways.  It is imnportant  however, to
examine further what is the worst possible scenario for  the pension industry, how the industry
would be affected, and what would  be the regulatory options to deal with these extreme cases.
The worst possible scenario for pension funds is essentially the same scenario for banks and
other financial  intermediaries. The economy is subject to a major macroeconomic  shock, generally
following a  period  of  rapid  output growth.  The  period of  expansion may  involve several
inefficiencies in resource allocation and the financing of numerous projects of dubious return by
banks and other financial intermediaries.  The period of expansion may also be accompanied by
steep increases in asset prices, possibly unsustainable asset price bubbles, particularly in equity
markets, but also in other markets such as real estate.  The shock is usually triggered by a balance
of payments crisis, and typically  provokes a policy response  that includes  a real devaluation,  a fiscal
adjustment,  and an initial contraction  of credit.
The shock and the policy response cause usually an immediate rise in interest rates and a
contraction in  economic activity,  concentrated in  the  sectors  that  were  overexpanded and
overleveraged. Several enterprise become insolvent  and bank portfolios deteriorate rapidly, leading
to bank insolvency  as well.  A loss of confidence  triggering runs on banks is frequently observed in
these cases.  Irrespective of whether there are bank runs or not, asset prices decline, and if the
period of expansion was accompanied  by asset price bubbles, the new equilibrium levels may be
substantially  lower.  Moreover, the decline in asset prices may involve an initial undershooting-
prices decline initially  more than their new lower equilibrium  level.
Pension funds can be affected by a financial crisis in two fundamental ways.  First, they
may experience  a major decline in the nominal and real value of their portfolios.  The drop in value
is sharper the larger the share of equity and long-term fixed income assets.  Second, they may be
subject  to negative spillover  effects from other areas of the financial  and real sectors.  The spillover
effects are potentially more severe in the cases where there is no clear asset seggregation, i.e.,
where the pool  of pension assets  is not  clearly  separated from the  assets of  other  financial
intermediaries  and companies.
The decline in the real value of pension funds' asset portfolios implies a  commensurate
decline in the accumulated  individual  balances and in future pensions, but the impact of this decline
needs to be examined considering the long time horizon and holding periods with which pension
funds operate.  Most of the cohorts that experienced a decline in real asset prices as a result of a
financial  crisis probably benefitted from sharp increases in prices in the period preceding the crisis.
29The long holding  periods imply a smoothing  of periods of price level fluctuations,  and even of sharp
price level bubbles and bursts.
The effect of long holding  periods can be appreciated  by examining  the average real returns
of pension funds in the OECD over the last three decades.  As shown  in Figure 2, the average real
returns of pension funds in the OECD were negative during the 1970s.  During this decade, the
world economy was subject to two oil shocks that caused a sharp contraction  in economic activity
and unexpected  price jumps.  Equity markets were depressed during the period, and pension funds
also realized sharp capital losses in their portfolio of long-term fixed income securities.  On the
other hand, during the 1980s and  1990s real returns were extremely high, probably driving the
overall average return over the three decades to around 5-6 percent p.a.,  some 3-4 percent above
average wage growth during the same period.  These unweighted averages mask  significant
differences across countries.  Pension funds subject to  less  restrictive investment regulations
achieved  higher returns.
Figure 2: Annual Real Returns  in OECD
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The smoothing  effect of long holding periods is generally reassuring, although  it must also
be  recognized that fluctuations in asset prices may lead to differences in average returns and
replacement  ratios across cohorts with the same level of income, even after considering  the long-run
averaging effect.  In a simulation  with US data on asset returns covering 125 years (1970-1995),
Alier and Vittas (1999) find that the average return on a balanced portfolio  (consisting  of 60 percent
equity and 40 percent fixed income assets, and held for a period of 40 years) would have ranged
from around 2.5 percent p.a. in the early part of the century, to more than 8 percent p.a. in the post
WWII period.  These differences in average rates of return would have translated into significant
differences  in replacement  ratios-a  10 percent contribution  rate would have generated replacement
ratios ranging from a minimum  of 22 percent to a maximum  of 70 percent.
These results should be examined with caution, as they probably overestimate the likely
differences in replacement  ratios across cohorts generated  by real systems today.  For one, Alier
and Vittas also show that only 11 percent of the cohorts would have received replacement ratios
under 30 percent of final wages.  Achieving a 30  percent replacement ratio with a  10 percent
contribution rate is a better result than that provided by most PAYG systems in demographically
mature countries.  Secondly,  the dispersion in average rates of return would be reduced if the first
30decades of the century were excluded  from the sample.  Thirdly, many pension funds already apply
asset management  techniques  designed  to smooth the fluctuations  in returns over time, and the scope
for smoothing  returns has increased with increasing portfolio diversification, the development  of
derivatives, and other hedging techniques.
Although  Alier  and  Vittas'  results  probably  overestimate  the  likely  differences in
replacement  ratios, they do illustrate  the potential  effets of market risk on retiring cohorts, and raise
two important questions for regulators.  The first question is the  size of workers'  exposure to
market risk, and whether there are instruments  to deal directly with this type of risk.  The second is
whether there  are other  regulations that  would strengthen the governance and  management of
pension funds and their capacity to cope with these and other risks.  In examining these questions,
possible lessons  from banking regulation  will be identified.
4.2.  Copying with  Market Risk: Possibilities  and Pitfalls
The exposure of the average retiring worker to market risk depends in the first place on the
relative size of the private pillars of retirement provision, particularly the size of the second pillar.
Multi-pillar  systems contain already an element of risk diversification,  as the implicit returns on the
first pillar contributions are weakly correlated with the second pillar returns.  7  The new second
pillars that have been introduced  in most Central European countries and in many Latin American
countries generally account for 25-50 percent of total mandatory contributions (Chile being the
exception rather than the rule in this regard).  Therefore, the exposure of the average worker to
market risk is already diluted by the multi-pillar construction. It is important to have this in mind,
as most measures  available  to reduce market risk involve complications  and negative side-effects.
Assuming that pension funds exhaust the potential for risk reduction by proper portfolio
diversification  (including investment  in foreign assets), portfolio risk is reduced to systematic, non-
diversifiable market risk.  There are five possible ways to deal with this risk.  The first is to
introduce DB schemes.  The second is to introduce guarantees on minimum second pillar returns
and/or benefits.  The third is to  allow multiple portfolios.  The fourth is to allow deferral of
annuities.  The fifth is to introduce variable annuities or a  sequence of fixed annuities.  These
different solutions  are examined  in more detail below.
Introducing  DB schemes. DB schemes deal with market risk by introducing  an element of
inter-generational  risk pooling.  However, as mentioned before, DB schemes also generate several
complications  in the labor market and are much more difficult to regulate and supervise. The inter-
generational  risk pooling is also weakened  in practice by the penalties imposed on early leavers, and
may be further weakened  when the sponsor faces financial difficulties.  Most importantly, it would
be very difficult to implement  a mandatory, privately-managed  second pillar on a standardized  DB
basis.  In fact, the tightening  of regulation in voluntary DB schemes in the US and the UK, and the
increasing  costs of compliance  for employers, is the major reason for the trend from DB to DC in
the two countries.
Guarantees  on  second  pillar  benefits.  Guarantees  on  minimum  second  pillar
returns/benefits  also introduce an element of inter-generational  risk pooling.  Examples of this type
of guarantees are the Swiss  minimum  4 percent nominal return (around 2 percent in real terms), and
the Hungarian minimum  second pillar benefit, which is equivalent  to a minimum  lifetime real return
27 Palacios  (1998)  correlates  wage  growth  (a proxy  for PAYG  returns)  with  equity  returns  (a proxy
for second  pillar returns)  for five  OECD  countries  in the 1953-95  period, and obtains  very low  or negative
correlation  coefficients.
31of 0-4 percent, depending on the age of the worker (around 2 percent on an age-weighted  basis).
Both guarantees  are backed from a central guarantee  fund to which all funds must contribute.
The  introduction of  absolute  guarantees on  second pillar  benefits  generate  similar
complications  as those generated  by deposit  insurance and guarantees  in general.  As mentioned in
section 2, the main lessons  from the experience  with deposit insurance  in the last decades is that the
guarantees should be partial, backed by  risk-based capital requirements and risk-based insurance
premia. The constructions  above do not seem to contain most of these elements.
A guaranteed real rate of return of 2 percent applied an on annual basis can hardly be seen
as partial.  Although  the rate itself is lower than the average real return in the OECD over the last
three decades, and what would  be expected from a private  pillar, its application  on a annual basis is
problematic.  It allows workers to share periods of boom in asset prices (including price bubbles)
without sharing the downside risk, leading actually to a return above the long-run market average.
This guarantee would either prove unsustainable or wouid need to  be financed by  very  large
contributions to the guarantee fund and/or the  imposition of large fees by  the asset manager,
therefore reducing the overall net return.  An alternative, but equaly undesirable outcome, would
involve a  very conservative portfolio selection by the asset manager and low returns for fund
members.
The Hungarian construction for young workers is better in this regard, as it establishes a
minirnum real return of around 0 percent, computed over the whole working life.  However, this
construction introduces other problems, primarily the difficulty to link the guarantee with capital
protection from asset managers/sponsors.  This  link can only be  easily established when the
minimum  return applies to the level of the fund, not the individual. The Hungarian system tries to
cope with this problem  by also imposing  a minimum  annual return on the funds, relative to a market
benchmark, but the reserve requirements are  imposed on the pension fund itself (a non-profit
mutual), not the asset manager.  As mentioned before, neither of the two constructions places
private capital explicitly at risk, nor defines the insurance premia on  a risk related basis.  The
contributions to the central guarantee fund in both countries are flat, and around 0.4  percent of
contributions  in the case of Switzerland  and Hungary.
Designing an absolute guarantee on second pillar benefits that reduces the  exposure of
individuals  to market risk, is financially sustainable, and minimizes moral hazard, proves to be a
very complex task.  It would probably have to include the following  elements: (i) a minimum return
on  individual second pillar contributions, applied over the working life.  This minimum return
would have to be sufficiently  low to be sustainable and maintain the worker's interest to monitor
his/her pension fund; (ii) a minimum performance obligation  on the asset manager/sponsor.  The
minimum real return imposed on the asset manager would also have to be sufficiently low and
computed over a relatively long period, say 36 rolling months or longer; (iii) the imposition of
explicit, possibly risk-based,  capital/reserve requirements  on the asset manager/sponsor  backing the
minimum  return;  and  (iv)  the  imposition of  risk-based insurance  premia  on  the  asset
managers/pension  funds.
The complexity  in design can be further appreciated  by noting that it would not be easy to
differentiate  capital requirements  and insurance  premia according to risk.  Attempting  to establish  a
relation between capital requirements  and insurance premia on the one side, and portfolio risk on
the other side, could lead pension funds to avoid equity, contradicting  some of the main objectives
of a second  pillar.  The regulators could limit themselves  to differentiating  institutions  according to
capital strength and/or quality of management,  but it is not clear the extent to which ratings heavily
weighted by subjective  evaluations  by the supervisors  would  be accepted  by the institutions.
32On balance, absolute guarantees on  second pillar benefits seem to raise more costs and
complexities than benefits, and  should generally be  avoided, especially in  countries where the
private mandatory  pillar is a component  of a multi-pillar system, and accounts for less than half of
contributions.  If absolute guarantees are deemed as essential, they should be kept sufficiently  low
and computed over a  relatively long period.  These guarantees should be matched by  explicit
capital/reserve requirements at the level of the asset manager/sponsor.  When a guarantee fund is
created, consideration  should be given to differentiating  insurance premia, although  the criteria for
differentiation  should be probably restricted to capital and quality of governance/management.
Multiple portfolios.  As mentioned before, the introduction of more portfolio choices to
workers provides an alternative mechanism to deal with market risk.  The assumption  underlying
this solution  is that workers will make informed  portfolio choices, and will hold progressively lower
shares of equity  as they approach retirement.  Under this construction, the workers are expected to
bear fully the consequences  of poor investments.  and the Government is not expected  to intervene  if
the outcomes  are not favorable.
This construction is elegant in principle but not without pitfalls either.  Evidence from
401(k) plans suggests that portfolio choices may not be optimal among several segments of the
population-relatively large numbers of young workers seem to hold small amounts of equity and
relatively large numbers of old workers seem to hold large amounts of equity.  There is no reason
to believe that workers in less sophisticated financial environments would make more informed
choices.  A complete withdrawal of the Governmnent  in these cases is open to doubt.  Moreover,
given the long holding periods (30-40 years), it is not clear how large is the gain of a strategy that
involves declining  equity shares (say, from 80 to 20 percent of the portfolio), relative to a balanced
portfolio (with 50-60 percent invested  in equity) throughout the holding  period. 28
The strategy of multiple portfolio to deal with market risk faces one additional constraint in
the case of new second pillars.  It is generally recommended that new private pillars in emerging
markets start with conservative portfolios and gradually build their holdings of equity and other
riskier assets, as capital markets mature in depth and liquidity.  Therefore, one cannot expect that
young workers will be  holding large  shares of  equity in  the  early  years of  implementation.
Expecting  the workers to hold less equity in the final years when they cannot hold large amounts in
their first years implies a relatively low proportion of equity over the working life, which defeats
some of the objectives  of a second  pillar.
Deferral of annuities.  The deferral of annuities allows retiring workers to postpone the
conversion of their accumulated  balance into an annuity, thus preventing an unfavorable year to
give rise to lower annuities.  This is a measure which provides some flexibility without distorting
incentives, and should be allowed under any regulatory framework.  This measure has obvious
limitations,  however, as not all workers can afford postponing  their annuities.
Variable  annuities or sequenced  purchase of fixed annuities.  Variable annuities (or phased
withdrawals)  could allow workers to diversify market risk to a significant extent.  Workers retiring
in a bad year could experience a  sharp recovery in the real value of their pensions during the
retirement period, when markets would be expected to recover.  Alier and Vittas (1999) show that
variable annuities could raise significantly the minimum and average replacement ratios-in  their
simulations, the conversion of half of the final balance into a  variable annuity could raise the
minimum replacement ratio from around 22 percent to around 40  percent.  The problem with
variable annuities,  however, is that they expose retirees to fluctuations in replacement ratios during
28 Alier and Vittas (1999) show that a gradual switch into bonds five years before retirement would
not reduce  significantly  differences  in replacement  ratios  across  cohorts.
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to fluctuations  in replacement  ratios is the gradual purchase of fixed annuities  (e.g. five annuities,
purchased gradually five years before retirement).  This solution would also raise the minimum
replacement  ratio and reduce dispersion, although its effects would be much smaller in comparison
with variable annuities.
In sum, most attempts to limit market risk may cause more harm than benefits, and should
be generally avoided, or  very  cautiously introduced.  Among the potential options available,
allowing  deferral of pensions  and developing  different annuity packages are probably the ones with
the least negative side-effects. Multiple portfolios may prove an elegant  construction for voluntary
pillars  in  sophisticated financial  systems.  Their  introduction  in  mandatory  pillars  in  less
sophisticated financial environments requires a  more  careful evaluation of  costs and  benefits.
Absolute guarantees raise even more substantive questions, excepting for guarantees which are
limited to fraud and theft.  When absolute guarantees are introduced, regulators  should ensure that
the guarantee is sufficiently  low and backed by the capital of asset managers/sponsors,  particularly
in the cases where there is also a central guarantee fund.  In these cases, regulators should explore
the scope for introducing risk-based insurance premia, but the criteria for differentiating premia
should not distort portfolio strategy  to the detriment of fund members.
4.3.  Improving  the Regulatory  Framework: Other  Lessons
Portfolio Diversification. Pension funds  which  are  restricted to  a  narrow  range  of
investments may find themselves with excessive holdings of a  few asset categories and greater
vulnerability to  real  and financial shocks.  Therefore,  before considering the  introduction of
guarantees and other measures to  deal with market risk, policy makers should ensure that the
potential  for portfolio  diversification  is fully explored.
Means of limiting this risk lie in the adoption of less restrictive investment  regimes, when
the development  and security of capital markets establish conditions that make it feasible. Unlike
banks, pension funds have much longer investment  horizons and fewer liquidity constraints  to limit
their capacity to manage risk through broad diversification.  Permitting  limited entry into market
segments (i.e.,  foreign equities, venture capital) that offer the potential  for increased yields and
cross segment diversification,  provide a potential to avoid exposure to the kind of crises banking
systems have experienced.  However, it is also clear that permitting these investments  would need
to be contingent on  utilization of risk management strategies that would complicate the job  of
regulators.  A  careful phasing of the  relaxation of  restrictions and the imposition of hedging
requirements  would be critical to the success of such an approach.
Valuation and Auditing.  Even  regulatory regimes that  involve intensive supervisory
activities  and afford authorities  the capacity for rapid interventions,  must ultimately  rely on reliable
and consistent  valuation  methods and an efficient auditing  function. The value of the most technical
and restrictive approach to the control of assets is only as good as the valuation and verification
methods  that are used to support them.  Some of  the recent problems in banking system  have arisen
out of lax controls on the activities  of auditors and allowing assets to be carried at dubious values.
Even the high levels of supervisory oversight have been unable to fully address this problem, in
some cases because of collusion between auditors and management  officials  and in others due to the
lack of competence  among  auditors.
This issue is potentially  of even greater concern in the oversight  of pension funds, because
of the direct linkage between  members and the assets backing their individual  accounts. There are
some useful lessons from banking regulation that may find application  in the pension industry.  One
lesson relates to the degree of independence  of auditors from management. In order to avoid that
34the  quality  and  integrity of  the  auditing function be  diminished by  interference from  the
management of pension funds or asset managers, it would be useful to introduce an obligatory
rotation of  auditors, make  external auditors directly accountable to the  boards, as opposed to
management, restrict the ability of management to fire the auditor without board approval, and
force the auditor to report to the supervisor the reasons for his resignation or firing.  The second
lesson  deals with the integration  of external auditing in the supervision  process.  Supervisors  should
be empowered to influence  the scope and depth of the external audits, and have full access to all the
audit results.  The third lesson deals with the legal liability of external auditors.  The potential
power of external audits in the valuation and monitoring of funds' activities, is only realized when
auditors face clear penalties for failing to discharge  their functions,  and these penalties  are enforced.
Countries that introduce  new private pillars must make a special effort to develop the audit
profession and improve  its regulation.  Developing  a reliable external audit function  may take time,
and in these cases most of the burden of the monitoring of pension funds may have to fall on the
supervisors. However, it is important  to ensure progress in this area, in order to spread the burden
of supervision more  evenly over time.  Developing the external audit  function is even  more
important in countries envisaging  hybrid systems, i.e., systems combining open and occupational-
based funds.  Hybrid systems may provide more competition  to open funds and help contain costs,
particularly marketing costs,  but they  also involve a  larger number of  players, stretching the
capacity of the  supervisor even further.  In these cases,  effective supervision will require a
developed audit function and its close integration  with supervisory processes.
Regulation  offees.  There  is a debate on whether regulation  of the level and/or the  structure
of  fees  have  a  significant impact  on  marketing activities  and  the  switching across  funds.
Recommendations  to solve the problem range from capping  fees and marketing costs, to a complete
deregulation  of the structure of fees (Vittas (1998)). It remains to be seen if manipulation  of fees in
the industry can make a fundamental  difference in behavior and performance. The result of capping
fees may be a clustering of fees at the caps with all consumers effectively paying the maximum
allowable  rate.  An associated  problem may be a lack of transparency in fees.
Reducing the intensity of marketing activities and the large marketing costs may require a
more  fundamental change  in  the  industry's structure.  In  a  pension system,  this  could  be
accomplished through mixed or hybrid approaches, incorporating voluntary private alternatives,
either individual or employment based, and facilitating the entry of occupational schemes in the
second pillar as well. 29 Greater participation of occupational schemes in both the voluntary and
mandatory pillars, and the greater threat of entry by these institutions, could increase the market
contestability  that the industry in some countries seems to be lacking.  Needless to say, this would
require changes in the regulatory framework  to accommodate  the existence of two or more different
types of institution.
While it  is relatively simple to  recognize the potential benefits of a  transition from a
restrictive to a hybrid system, effectuating  such a transition also imposes risks and  challenges. An
evolution  of this nature is analogous  the deregulation  of financial  institutions, including  banks, that
remains ongoing in many countries. One of the key lessons obtained from the experience  of banks
is that such a transition, especially when attempted as a rapid response to structural problems, is
often poorly planned, and  may lead to many unintended consequences, including failures and
crisis. 30 The lesson to be  derived from this for  pension is that a  transition to a  hybrid, more
29 As pointed  out by Vittas  (1998),  the discussion  of hybrid  systems  also  raises  the issue  of whether
the second  pillar  mandate  should  be shifted  from  the employee  to the employer.
3 As bank rates and lending  and investment  restrictions  were rapidly  deregulated  in the United
States,  there  was not a concurrent modernization  of the regulatory process.  Left with long term low yielding
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regulatory and supervisory systems in fully considered and planned.  It would be advisable for
countries to consider such a transition  at the outset of a reform (see below).
4.4.  Building Supervision  Capacity
Bank regulatory agencies tend to be large and expensive to operate, relative to other types
of  regulatory and supervisory agencies. This is due to the complexity  of the supervisory tasks, in
conjunction with the highly pro-active nature of  their supervisory activities.  These costs may be
directly paid  through the assessment of fees  on  all  institutions or  more broadly  imposed by
assignment  to general budgets.  Bank regulators will have several full time staff for each entity they
oversee, and the highly technical nature of the work makes these relatively expensive personnel.
Pro-active supervisory approaches are heavily reliant on the provision of frequent reports and a
greater number of interventions,  and these also impose  other costs on the supervised  entities.
Pro-active supervision  in banking has emerged as result of banking crisis and failures, and
attempts to identify and correct problems at an early stage, before they become too large and costly
to  solve.  However, pro-active supervision itself can be costly.  Pro-active and interventionist
systems are sometimes  also criticized for not accommodating  to the pace of change and innovation
in modem financial  markets.  Moreover, even pro-active approaches  have not been able to avoid
episodes of bank failures.  These failures have been partly due to regulatory forbearance caused by
political pressures.  However, there is also a growing awareness that pro-active  supervision cannot
be  a substitute for  good corporate governance, competent management, and a  more continuous
monitoring  of the institution  by other active market  players.
As mentioned in section 2, the philosophy  of banking supervision  has been evolving  in most
developed countries, from a strict and narrow approach focused on the monitoring of quantitative
regulations, to assessment of the banks' risk management  capacity, and development of means to
transfer more responsibility to  other market players.  This has  required, inter alia,  efforts to
improve  the overall legal and institutional  framework, clarify the duties and responsibilities  of board
members, improve disclosure, enhance the  role of  non-insured depositors, and  strengthen the
external audit function. The pension industry in some countries may face similar  challenges.
Emerging countries implementing  mandatory systems may conclude that it is inevitable to
introduce pro-active supervision policies in the first stages of  reform implementation.  This is
because these countries still do not have the legal and institutional  structures required for a more
decentralized  but also reliable supervision  mode. However, the supervisor should have as long-run
objective the strengthening of the institutional  mechanisms that would allow a  more distributed
burden of supervision  in the future.  In addition to strengthening  the areas of regulation identified
above, there  are other interesting measures that could be considered.  For example, requiring
statements of investment policy objectives, as apparently required from pension funds in the new
mandatory system in Hong Kong, may prove a  useful tool to promote better risk management
techniques  by pension finds/asset managers  (Vittas (1998)).
The need to start the reforms with more pro-active supervision  policies may imply the need
to restrict entry initially and limit the number of institutions  to a manageable  size.  However, the
regulatory framework should not prevent the entry of employer-based  schemes, but rather limit
assets  many banks  became  overextended  in new speculative  areas to compete  for deposits  contributing  to
many failures  before regulatory  systems  were restructured  to reflect  the new realities. A recent study  of
Japan  (Hoshi  and  Kashyap,  (1999))  concludes  that a timing  mismatch  in the deregulation  of banks  has played
a major  role in  the current  banking  problems.
36entry through the imposition  of minimum number of members and other professional requirements.
Maintaining a credible threat of entry is essential, as it may help impose discipline and contain
costs, especially  marketing  costs, even if the system  has relatively  few institutions  initially.
Increasing the number of players raises many additional issues, particularly the issue of
economies of scale and scope.  It is sometimes argued that increasing the number of players may
improve competition  but also produce inefficiencies  in scale.  There is a misunderstanding in this
area, because small and medium size funds in the OECD primarily outsource the administration  and
the management  of their assets. The asset management  industry is more consolidated  and may well
be scale efficient. Of course, expanding  the number of funds and restricting severely the number of
asset managers may yield little results.  However, the asset management industry is in general a
competitive  industry, and it is easy to attract new entrants into the industry.
Increasing  the number  of players does not mean aiming at a very fragmented structure, such
as the one observed in most OECD countries (Table 1).  The target number should probably be at
the order of dozens or hundreds, not tens and hundreds of thousands, as in most OECD countries.
A  very fragmented structure may indeed create problems in costs and  compliance, despite the
outsourcing of tasks by smaller institutions.  What should be the total number of players and the
minimum size required to obtain a  license are important questions that are not addressed in this
paper.  More empirical research on scale and scope economies in the pension industry, and other
related industries would  provide  useful inputs  to pension regulators. 3'
Table 1: Number  of Banks, Pension  Funds, and Asset Managers  in Selected  Countries
Banks  Pension  Funds  Asset Managers
Chile  28  8  8
Argentina  83  13  13
Hungary  43  32 in 2nd pillar  45
240 in 3rd pillar
Poland  83  19 in 2nd pillar  29
10 in 3rd pillar
Czech Republic  50  38  n.a.
UK  468  Hundreds  of  n.a.
thousands
US  10956  c.a. 700,000  n.a.
Australia  50  c.a.  150,000  n.a.
Switzerland  394  c.a.  11,000  Hundreds
Netherlands  99  c.a.  21,000  Several hundred
Ireland  71  c.a.  64,000  18
Sources:  OECD  (1999),  Bank  Supervision  Agencies  in Several  Countries.
Independence  of  Regulators.  Higher  levels  of  regulatory  and  supervisory  authority  in
conjunction  with the  concentration  of  the  industry  in a  relatively  small number  of  actors  requires
insulation of the regulator  from political pressures.  When faced with a crisis  in the financial sector,
political leaders  have often brought pressure  on bank  regulators  to engage  in policies  of forbearance
31 There have been many studies of scale and scope economies in banking, but the authors are not
aware of sirnilar studies for the pension industry.  The empirical literature on banks generally concludes  that
the average  cost curve is relatively  flat, with scale  inefficiencies  for both the smallest  and largest banks.
There is subtantial  disagreement  on the minimum efficient scale of production, and the results seem to vary
significantly  according to the specific sample.  There is no consensus  on the existence of scope economies.
Clark (1996)  provides a brief survey of the literature.
37or to delay interventions. This has occurred  in response  to the attempts by owners and shareholders
to protect their interests, but also by politicians' desire to limit the perception of crisis at crucial
junctures.  The result has often been to ultimately  make problems deeper or more costly when they
finally are addressed.
While this has clearly been an issue with banking regulators for some time, it is also of
concem for  the regulation of pension funds.  Although pension funds are much less subject to
systemic  runs and failures, they may well be subject to political pressures to invest in Government
paper and other sectors favored by the Government.  The regulator may be induced to taylor the
investment guidelines to these objectives, or may be pressed to ignore the violation of existing
regulations. The regulators  may also be pressed to postpone intervention in pension funds subject  to
fraudulent practices.  Insulating  the regulator from these pressures is of paramount importance, and
in many cases requires establishing  an independent  institution with clear board responsibilities  and
terms independent from the political cycle.  Ensuring independence in pension supervision is in
some respects even more important, because it is more difficult to  design "prompt corrective
action" rules similar to those applied to bank supervisors, at least in the case of DC schemes.
The need to coordinate the activities  of pension supervision with other supervision  agencies
is another issue that is in the agenda of regulators in many countries.  Pension fund supervisors
have to rely in the supervision  of many other sectors of the financial system, and this is performed
by different  agencies.  Although  the need  for coordination  is clear, some legal systems  restrict even
the flow of information  among supervisors, on the presumption that sharing of information  would
violate private secrecy rights. 32 As a minimum, the legal framework should allow supervisors to
share information, and even promote co-ordination by having the chief supervisors of different
agencies  participating  in each other boards, or creating a commission of capital market supervision
comprising  the head of each supervision  agency.  A more structured solution  would involve  a fully
integrated  supervision  agency, such as the one recently implemented  in the UK.
5.  Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this paper was twofold, to review the literature on the regulation of the
bank and pension industries,  and to identify  possible improvements in the regulation of the pension
industry, in light of developments  in banking regulation in the recent decades.  The paper stresses
the fundamental differences between banks and  pension funds,  and the  fact that many of the
regulations in banking cannot be easily transplanted to the pension industry, or are simply not
applicable to the industry.  However, the paper also identified a number of other regulations  that
may find application  in the industry.
The review of banking regulation and supervision reveals a number of developments  in the
recent decades.  Most of these regulatory developments have been motivated by  the efforts to
counteract the  moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, and  the political interference in  the
supervision process.  Whereas no  country has  removed deposit insurance,  there  have  been
increasing efforts to  improve market discipline by,  inter alia,  limiting the scope of insurance,
enhancing  the role of uninsured  creditors, and introducing risk-based capital requirements  and risk-
insurance premia.
32 This  problem  is common  among  Central  and Eastern  European  countries. After several  decades
under communist  rule, the legal reforms  in the early 1990s  placed  great importance  on individual  rights,
sometimes  going  beyond  the levels  of secrecy  protection  in Western  countries  and imposing  difficulties  to
supervision  activities.
38There is also a growing awareness  that even the most pro-active supervision  agencies  cannot
bear all the burden of bank monitoring. The philosophy of supervision  has been changing, from a
narrow verification of compliance with quantitative regulations, to a  broader assessment of the
quality of corporate governance and the institutions' capacity to manage risks.  There have been
equal efforts to spread the burden of supervision more equally among market players.  This has
required, among other factors, strengthening  the roles of boards and the external audit function, and
ensuring that their duties and responsibilities  are enforced.  Some countries have also made efforts
to reduce the room for political interference and regulatory forbearance by introducing "prompt
corrective actions" by the supervisors.  The organization of supervision is being subject to review,
and some countries are integrating  their different agencies into a single agency.
In reviewing the literature on pension funds, the paper draws attention to the great variety
of pension fund structures across countries.  The paper concentrates on the two major models,
however:  open  funds  operated  by  separate  management companies,  and  occupational-based
trusts/foundations/mutuals. The paper identifies prudential regulations that are applicable to both
models, but stresses that the same regulation is frequently adapted to the specific model, and that
some regulations are entirely model-specific. Regulations common to both models include asset
segregation  rules,  the  imposition of  independent custodian and  external  audits,  disclosure
requirements, and  portfolio diversification rules.  There  are  some differences  in  disclosure
requirements between the two models, and marked differences between investment requirements
between models, and even between  countries following  the same model.
Some countries have introduced guarantees on second pillar benefits that raise important
issues related to  viability, costs, and  incentives.  Relative guarantees are generally not very
ambitious and do not seem to have caused financing  problems or induced  moral hazard.  However,
they  are  blamed for  the intense herding behavior in  the countries adopting these guarantees.
Absolute guarantees raise more substantive  questions about sustainability  and incentives.  The few
countries that have adopted them have not reported major problems, possibly because there  are
other, more informal channels, linking the guarantee with the capital of the sponsors. However, a
more explicit legal base is still lacking in these countries.
The paper stresses the marked differences in the approach to supervision  in the two models.
Countries adopting the open fund model have introduced a very pro-active supervision agency,
which generally establishes  strict entry criteria, and is tasked with monitoring  the compliance  with
detailed disclosure requirements and investmnent  regulations  by a limited number of licensed funds.
Countries that have  historically adopted the occupational model follow a  reactive supervision
approach, largely because of the much larger number of institutions.  The reactive model has
proved functional, but requires a level of institutional  and legal development  that many emerging
countries do not have at the present time.
There are no  studies providing a  detailed comparison of  fund performance in the two
models.  The average returns of occupational-based  pension funds in several OECD countries have
been comparable or higher than the returns of Chilean funds, whereas the average returns in other
OECD countries have been lower.  The differences  in returns seem to be more due to differences in
regulation than model-specific. Countries following the prudent man rule seem to have achieved
higher returns.  Occupational  funds seem to operate with lower costs than open funds, particularly
because of the absence of marketing costs, but again there are no  detailed and  comprehensive
studies of costs.  Some papers in the literature also indicate the possibility for promoting hybrid
models, in order to enhance  competition  to open funds and reduce marketing  costs.
The main section of the paper tries to examine whether there is scope for improvements  in
pension regulation. The section starts by examining worst case scenarios involving financial  crisis,
39while also pointing out the smoothing  effects of long asset holding periods, and the fact that multi-
pillar constructions already contain an  element of  risk  diversification.  However, the  paper
recognizes that private funded systems will always be subject to market risk, and examines five
possible solutions to deal with this  risk,  including DB schemes, absolute guarantees, multiple
portfolios, pension deferrals, and the introduction  of different annuity packages (including  variable
annuities  and sequenced  fixed annuities).
This  section points  out that  most  attempts to  deal  with  market  risk  may  introduce
complications  and negative side-effects.  In this regard, the paper indicates that pension deferrals
and the introduction  of different annuity  packages are probably the best options to deal with market
risk, while absolute  guarantees are the option that may cause most damage.  The paper recommends
that absolute  guarantees  be avoided,  while also providing more specific suggestions  for design in the
countries where they are introduced.  These include keeping the guarantees low, putting private
capital (of sponsors and asset managers) explicitly at  risk before granting access to  a  central
guarantee  fund. and introducing  risk-based insurance  premia.
The paper identifies other possible lessons from the banking industry.  These include the
need for more flexible  rules aimed at enhancing  portfolio diversification,  and strengthen  governance
rules  in  general,  including the  duties  and  responsibilities of  boards,  and  the  scope  and
responsibilities  of external auditors.  The paper stresses the need to achieve progress in these areas
in order to spread the burden  of supervision  more evenly among  a larger number of players.
Finally,  the paper  explores some of  the  issues that  would have  to  be  considered in
introducing  hybrid models. Countries introducing  mandatory pillars should restrict entry initially to
a  number of institutions that the  supervision agency can supervise effectively.  However, the
regulatory  framework  should allow both open and occupational  funds, and restrict entry only on the
basis of minimum  size and other professional requirements. Maintaining  a credible threat of entry
tmight  be important  even in the early stages of reform implementation. Ensuring further institutional
and regulatory development over  time might allow the supervisor to  distribute the  burden of
supervision more  evenly among other  market players,  and  facilitate the  entry  of  additional
institutions.  The strengthening  of governance and the capacity of the system to manage risk is
essential,  as it allows regulators  not only to relax entry and reduce costs, but also to introduce  more
flexible  investment  rules and create opportunities  for higher returns.
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The  increasing  role  of private  funded  systems  in the provision  of retirement
income  has  led  to an increasing  interest  in the analysis  of regulatory  and
supervisory  frameworks  of  the pension  industry.  This  paper  reviews  the
regulatory  framework  for  pensions  and  examines  whether  there  is  scope  for
improvements  in regulation  and  supervision.  In carrying  out this  analysis,  the
paper  also  reviews  briefly  the regulatory  framework  for banks  and  asks  whether
there  are  lessons  from bank  regulation  to pension  regulation.  Possible  lessons
from  the  banking  industry  arise  in  the  area  of guarantees,  portfolio  diversification,
and  the structure  of  supervision.  Many  countries  have  considered  the
introduction  of guarantees  to deal  with market  risk.  The  paper  argues  that
multi-pillar  constructions  already  reduce  the  workers'  exposure  to market  risk,
and  that  further  efforts  to reduce  this  risk  should  be very  cautiously  considered.
Within the  possible  solutions  to deal  with market  risk,  the  paper  favors
deferrals  of pensions  and different  packages  of annuities  over  guarantees.  The
paper  also  argues  that  pension  supervision  should  examine  the  trends  in bank
supervision,  which has  been  shifting  from a basic  inspection  of compliance
to a more  general  assessment  of  the quality  of corporate  governance  in banks,
and  a more  even  distribution  of responsibility  among  different  market  players,
including  boards,  shareholders,  and  external  auditors.
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